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Fine-grained access control is a conceptual approach to addressing database security 
requirements. In relational database management systems, fine-grained access control 
refers to access restrictions enforced at the row, column, or cell level. While a number of 
commercial implementations of database fine-grained access control are available, there 
are presently no generalized approaches to implementing fine-grained access control for 
relational database management systems.  
Fine-grained access control is potentially a good solution for database professionals and 
system architects charged with designing database applications that implement granular 
security or privacy protection features. However, in the oral tradition of the database 
community, fine-grained access control is spoken of as imposing significant performance 
penalties, and is therefore best avoided. Regardless, there are current and emerging 
social, legal, and economic forces that mandate the need for efficient fine-grained access 
control in relational database management systems. 
In the study undertaken, the author was able to quantify the performance costs associated 
with four common implementations of fine-grained access control for relational database 
management systems. Security benchmarking was employed as the methodology to 
quantify performance costs. Synthetic data from the TPC-W benchmark as well as 
representative data from a real-world application were utilized in the benchmarking 
process. 
A simple graph-base performance model for Fine-grained Access Control Evaluation 
(FACE) was developed from benchmark data collected during the study. The FACE 
model is intended for use in predicting throughput and response times for relational 
database management systems that implement fine-grained access control using one of 
the common fine-grained access control mechanisms – authorization views, the 
Hippocratic Database, label-based access control, and transparent query rewrite. The 
author also addresses the issue of scalability for fine-grained access control mechanisms 
that were evaluated in the study.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Controlling security in a relational database management system includes 
managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of stored data. Fine-grained 
access control can be employed with relational database management systems to ensure 
confidentiality of data at the column, row, and even at the cell level (Zhu, Shi, Wang, & 
Feng, 2008). However, current approaches to implementing fine-grained access control 
for relational database management systems incur significant challenges. These 
challenges can be summarized as follows: 
1. Fine-grained access control is a conceptual approach to providing enhanced 
security and privacy protection – it is not a specific technology. However, 
according to Wang et al. (2007), existing approaches to providing fine-grained 
access control for relational database management systems all have known 
problems. These problems include the return of incorrect query results, the 
return of incomplete query results, and leakage of information in 
contravention of fine-grained security policies (Wang et al.).   
2. Fine-grained access control has historically been implemented through custom 
applications external to the relational database management system. However, 
external fine-grained access control solutions are much less effective than 
fine-grained access control implemented directly within the database, as 
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internal solutions generally provide a significantly reduced attack surface 
(Roichman & Gudes, 2007). Moreover, security and privacy controls are 
much less likely to be bypassed if fine-grained access control is implemented 
within the database (Zhan, Li, Ye, & Wang, 2006). Recently, IBM
®
, Oracle
®
, 
and Sybase
® 
have begun to offer fine-grained access control capabilities 
integrated within their relational database management systems (Kabra, 
Ramamurthy, & Sudarshan, 2006). 
3. The use of fine-grained access control imposes performance penalties. 
Siegenthaler and Birman (2009) described this issue as the trade-off between 
the granularity of data protection and database performance. Still, some 
implementations of fine-grained access control can impose significant 
performance penalties. For example, Zhan et al. (2006) reported a 20-30% 
performance penalty when implementing a novel fine-grained access control 
solution within the PostgreSQL relational database management system. 
The access control mechanism provided natively in a relational database management 
system is known as “coarse-grained” access control (Wang et al., 2007). Coarse-grained 
access control for database objects is configured through Structured Query Language 
(SQL) using the statements GRANT and REVOKE to respectively permit or deny access 
to database objects (Majedi, Ghazinour, Chinaei, & Barker, 2009). However, Chaudhuri, 
Dutta, and Sudarshan (2007) characterized coarse-grained access control as all or 
nothing. Specifically, once coarse-grained access on a database table is granted to a 
database user, all rows in the table become accessible to that user, regardless of the 
sensitivity of the data in individual rows (Kabra et al., 2006).  
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In contrast to coarse-grained access control, fine-grained access control allows 
specific rows, columns, and even cells in a database table to be given different 
authorizations (Wang et al., 2007). Multiple factors motivate the need for fine-grained 
access control in relational database management systems. A key motivating factor is the 
requirement to provide secure access to relational database management systems from the 
Web (Roichman & Gudes, 2007). Increasing emphasis on data privacy and compliance 
with new, more encompassing privacy regulations are additional factors motivating the 
requirement for fine-grained access control (Bertino, Byun, & Li, 2005). The European 
Union Data Protection Directive and the Graham-Leach-Billey Act in the United States 
as are two examples of legislation driving the need for better privacy controls in database 
systems (Johnson & Grandison, 2007). However, the need to secure electronic healthcare 
data is often given as the leading example of privacy-sensitive information that could 
benefit significantly from the privacy preserving capabilities provided by fine-grained 
access control (Siegenthaler & Birman, 2009). In addition, considerable interest has been 
expressed in providing fine-grained authorizations for social networking applications in 
order to secure the privacy of personal data (Simpson, 2008; Majedi et al., 2009).  
Fine-grained access control enforces the rules specified in an access control 
policy (Wang et al., 2007). Access control policies may consist of both processes and 
structures utilized to document the rules for disclosure and use of data (Agrawal, 
Grandison, Johnson, & Kiernan, 2007). Thus, the definition of an access control policy 
can be broad and at times ambiguous. For example, Currim, Jung, Xiao, and Jo (2009) 
described access control policies as collections of rules with each rule being equivalent to 
a database view. Bruns, Dantas, and Huth (2007) described access control policies as 
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predicates that precisely specify access to data. Cho, Kim, Hong, and Cho (2009) 
provided yet another definition for access control policies – access control policies are 
lists of rules, which may exhibit a defined hierarchy and structure. 
Custom programming, using code embedded within individual applications, is the 
most widely adopted approach to providing fine-grained access control for applications 
that interface with relational database management systems (Kabra et al., 2006). 
Nevertheless, custom fine-grained access control solutions can be very difficult to 
maintain, particularly if a separate custom solution must be deployed for each single 
application (Wang et al., 2007). In addition, custom fine-grained access control solutions 
implemented at the application level can be easily bypassed (Rizvi, Mendelzon, 
Sudarshan, & Roy, 2004). Johnson and Grandison (2007) and Franzoni, Mazzoleni, 
Valtolina, and Bertino (2007) independently proposed conceptually similar approaches to 
fine-grained access control using a “middleware” layer. A middleware layer providing 
fine-grained access control may be shared by multiple applications without the need to 
modify the underlying application code (Johnson & Grandison, 2007). Still, middleware 
security solutions, as is the case with application-level security solutions, can be easily 
circumvented by connecting directly to the database. For example, reporting tools that 
connect directly to a relational database management system using an Open Database 
Connector (ODBC) provide a simple means to bypass fine-grained access controls 
implemented at the application or middleware layer (Santos & Bernardino, 2009).  
Implementing fine-grained access control within a relational database 
management system provides better security than either custom or middleware solutions 
(Roichman & Gudes, 2007). For example, Zhan et al. (2006) noted that fine-grained 
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access control implemented within a relational database management system is much 
more difficult to subvert than a fine-grained access control solution that is implemented 
outside the relational database management system. Moreover, fine-grained access 
control implemented at the database level ensures that security for both applications and 
ad hoc users is applied consistently (Wang et al., 2007). A number of commercial 
database vendors have responded to the need for fine-grained access control integrated 
within the database. As a case in point, IBM
®
, Oracle
®
, and Sybase
®
 now offer 
proprietary implementations of fine-grained access control within their respective 
relational database management products (Kabra et al., 2006). Microsoft
®
 also provides 
the capability to implement row and cell-level fine-grained access control in the SQL 
Server
® 
database, although the functionality is more loosely integrated than in the IBM
®
, 
Oracle
®
, or Sybase
®
 products  (Zhang, 2008). 
Over the last decade, there has been a significant increase in academic research 
pertaining to fine-grained access control for relational database management systems 
(Zhu et al., 2008). Still, Zhang (2008) acknowledges that little work has been done “…to 
address the performance issues of database systems with fine-grained access controls” (p. 
iii). Yet according to Kabra et al. (2006), performance is a key consideration when 
implementing fine-grained access control. Zhu and Lü (2007) summarized the current 
state of fine-grained access control for relational database management systems with the 
following statement, “Providing efficient and effective fine-grained access control for 
database management systems has long been an unresolved issue, however it is critically 
important for Internet-based data management systems” (p. 222). Zhu et al. (2008) 
cautioned that the integration of Web and database technology exposes large volumes of 
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valuable data to potential attacks from the Internet. Yu (2009) believes that fine-grained 
access controls are a critical requirement for Internet accessible Web-database 
applications “…to ensure the legal use of data and to prevent privacy breach” (p. 230).  
 
Statement of the Problem 
The problem that was studied in this dissertation concerns the performance 
penalties imposed by the use of fine-grained access control in relational database 
management systems. The work conducted addresses a significant problem that confronts 
database professionals and system architects when implementing fine-grained access 
control for relational database management systems. Specifically, which approach to 
providing fine-grained access control offers better performance? In the study conducted, 
the author undertook to quantify performance and scalability considerations associated 
with the use of fine-grained access control for relational database management systems. 
The results of author’s study provide empirical data concerning the performance and 
scalability for four fine-grained access control mechanisms. “Security in computing, as in 
anything else, comes with cost and overhead” (Benantar, 2005, p. 6). 
Performance penalties associated with the use of fine-grained access control in 
relational database management systems are known to be a significant concern. Johnson 
and Grandison (2007) in discussing privacy enforcement using fine-grained access 
control maintained that, “Effective privacy solutions must also be economically and 
computationally efficient…” (p. 256). However, much of the past research relating to the 
performance costs of fine-grained access control is narrowly focused – only the 
performance characteristics of novel solutions have been evaluated. For instance, 
LeFevre¸ Agrawal, Ercegovac, Ramakrishnan, Xu, and DeWitt (2004), Kabra et al. 
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(2006), Zhu and Lü (2007), and Zhu et al. (2008), all demonstrated statistically 
significant impacts to database performance when employing fine-grained access control 
within their specific research projects. In other cases, for example, Rizvi et al. (2004), 
Franzoni et al. (2007), and Pun, Chinaei, and Barker (2009), performance of fine-grained 
access control mechanisms was identified as an important research consideration, but was 
left as a task for future investigation.  
 
Dissertation Goal 
The goal of the study was to develop a simple generic model to address 
performance and scalability for fine-grained access control in relational database 
management systems. Melnik, Rahm, and Bernstein (2003) described the function of a 
generic model as providing a paradigm to illustrate concepts at a high level of abstraction 
using concise definitions. In the study conducted, the author employed a widely accepted 
benchmark to evaluate the performance and scalability of four implementation models of 
database fine-grained access control. According to Menascé and Almeida (2001), a 
benchmark must be relevant, understandable, scalable, and most importantly, widely 
accepted. The Transaction Processing Performance Council (TPC) has published a 
number of well-documented benchmarks (e.g., TPC-C, TPC-W) that are widely accepted 
(Menascé and Almeida). TPC benchmarks have been used in a number of previous 
studies to evaluate the performance impacts of fine-grained access control in relational 
database management systems (Kabra et al., 2006; Zhan et al., 2006; Zhu & Lü, 2007; 
Zhu et al., 2008). As well, TPC benchmarks continue to be used in research projects that 
involve evaluation of database performance and system scalability (Chaudhuri, 2009; He 
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& Veeraraghavan, 2009; Elnikety, Dropsho, Cecchet, & Zwaenepoel, 2009; Santos & 
Bernardino, 2009; Chakraborty, Majumdar, & Sural, 2010; Ahmad, Duan, Aboulnaga, & 
Babu, 2011). 
The fine-grained access control models evaluated by the author include 
authorization views, transparent query rewrite, the Hippocratic Database, and label-based 
access control (LBAC). Zhu et al. (2008) categorized these four implementation models 
as being representative of current approaches to providing fine-grained access control for 
relational database management systems. These four implementation models can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. Rizvi et al. (2004) and Roichman and Gudes (2007) discussed the use of 
parameterized authorization views for fine-grained access control. According 
to Kabra et al. (2006), authorization views may be implemented in any 
relational database management system using standard SQL.  
2. Transparent query rewrite provides the foundation for Oracle® row-level 
security, now called Oracle
® 
Virtual Private Database (Bertino et al., 2005). In 
the Oracle
® 
Virtual Private Database (VPD), the SQL WHERE clause is 
rewritten to include predicates from a corresponding fine-grained access 
control policy (Shi, Zhu, Fu, & Jiang, 2009). Transparent query rewrite uses 
the database query rewriter (an internal relational database component) to 
modify user queries in order to return only authorized data (Hellerstein, 
Stonebraker, & Hamilton, 2007). 
3. The Hippocratic Database provides a generic approach to fine-grained access 
control that can be implemented in most relational database management 
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systems (Agrawal et al., 2007). The Hippocratic Database is primarily 
intended to provide enhanced privacy preservation, but also provides fine-
grained authorizations (Johnson & Grandison, 2007). An implementation of 
the Hippocratic Database by LeFevre et al. (2004) employed query 
modification explicitly specified in SQL statements to enforce privacy 
policies – the privacy policies themselves were specified in the database. Yu 
(2009) described the implementation by LeFevre et al. as “…a practical and 
efficient approach to incorporating privacy policy enforcement into an 
existing application and database environment…” (p. 330). 
4. LBAC is a feature available in commercial relational database products from 
Oracle
®
 and IBM
®
 and can be emulated in Microsoft’s SQL Server® (Zhang, 
2008). In LBAC, each row in the database contains a security label (Bertino et 
al., 2005). LBAC is used in high security environments to secure classified 
data (Bishop, 2002). 
Vieira and Madeira (2005) proposed the use of standard benchmark suites as 
suitable instruments for evaluating the overhead imposed by database security 
mechanisms. Vieira and Madeira employed the TPC Benchmark™ W (TPC-W) to 
evaluate security overhead. Others, including Zhu et al. (2006), Manjhi, Ailamaki, 
Maggs, Mowry, Olston, and Tomasic (2006), and Zhu and Lü (2007), have employed the 
TPC-W benchmark to evaluate the performance of various security mechanisms in 
relational database management systems. However, much of the existing research on the 
topic of fine-grained access control utilizes benchmarking only as a means to validate 
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performance characteristics of novel solutions (Zhu & Lü, 2007; Olson, Gunter, & 
Madhusudan, 2008; Shi et al., 2009; Krishnamurthy, Mettler, & Wagner, 2010).   
Small-scale database systems can be used effectively to predict the performance 
and scalability of larger database systems. Elnikety et al. (2009) demonstrated the 
feasibility of using the TPC-W database benchmark on small-scale database servers to 
validate scalability predictions of analytical performance models. The approach taken by 
Elnikety et al. was to compare the goodness of the fit between predicted performance and 
actual results obtained from the TPC-W benchmark. The small-scale experimental 
configuration employed by Elnikety et al. utilized a readily available combination of 
commodity hardware and software – a single-core x86 architecture CPU, one gigabyte of 
server RAM, a single 120 GB disk drive, the Linux operating system, and the 
PostgreSQL open source database.  
Based upon the findings of this study, the author developed a simple generic 
model using benchmark results compiled from the PostgreSQL open source database. 
The proprietary fine-grained access control solutions marketed by Oracle
®
 and IBM
®
, 
respectively the Virtual Private Database and LBAC, were emulated within the 
PostgreSQL database. As well, authorization views and the Hippocratic Database, which 
can be implemented within any relational database management system, were also 
evaluated using the PostgreSQL database. The goal in developing the generic model was 
threefold:  
1. First, the generic model provides a reference viewpoint that encompasses 
current understanding of the performance issues attendant with the use of fine-
grained access control for relational database management systems.  
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2. Second, the generic model describes performance behavior that can be 
consistently reproduced using implementations of fine-grained access control 
mechanisms currently available for relational database management systems. 
3. Third, the generic model offers a research-based foundation for future 
scholarly work. The model that was developed provides performance 
comparisons of multiple implementation of fine-grained access control using 
the same server and database environment.  
 
Relevance and Significance 
 
The 2009 Claremont Report on Database Research identified data security and 
data privacy as among the leading issues facing database researchers today (Agrawal et 
al., 2009). To clarify, data security is concerned with ensuring the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of data (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). On the other hand, data 
privacy is concerned with enforcing the rights of individuals to determine how and when 
personal information is released (Agrawal, Kiernan, Srikant, & Xu, 2002). According to 
Yu (2009), current research in the area of database security tends to treat data security 
and data privacy protection as two completely separate issues. However, Yu found this 
situation unsatisfactory given requirements “… to provide a mechanism which supports 
access control and privacy protection in [the] DBMS simultaneously…” (p. 330).  
Significantly, a number of existing implementations of fine-grained access control 
are capable of satisfying requirements for both data security and data privacy. Fine-
grained access control for relational database management systems can also provide 
enhanced data security (Zhu et al., 2008). Enhanced data privacy is possible using 
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implementations of fine-grained access control that employ privacy policies specified in 
metadata or privacy-policy tables (Bertino et al., 2005). Protection of electronic 
healthcare information is a leading example of data that could benefit from mechanisms 
providing both enhanced data security and enhanced privacy protection.  
In a 2004 report, the U.S. President’s Information Technology Advisory 
committee (PITAC) stated that the capability to ensure privacy of health care records is 
critical in transitioning from paper-based health care records to networked, electronic 
health care systems (Agrawal et al., 2007). Johnson and Grandison (2007) described the 
requirement to exchange health care data as an area where fine-grained access control can 
provide a suitable mechanism for enforcement of data privacy. However, privacy 
concerns for electronic healthcare systems continue to be a significant challenge to the 
present day (He & Yang, 2009; Siegenthaler & Birman, 2009) 
Fine-grained access control provides a viable mechanism for protecting Web 
accessible databases. Zhu and Lü (2007) characterized the need for fine-grained access 
control in large-scale database systems as the logical outcome of the integration between 
Internet-based technologies and enterprise relational database management systems. Zhu 
et al. (2008) described the capabilities provided by fine-grained access control as offering 
access control that is both flexible and effective in Web accessible databases. Pan (2009) 
stated that fine-grained access control provides a workable mechanism to protect Web 
accessible databases from malicious attacks. Yu (2009) perceived fine-grained access 
control for relational database management systems as a mechanism to ensure secure 
access to data, as well as providing an effective means to preventing privacy breaches. 
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The requirements for fine-grained access control are not restricted simply to 
relational database management systems. Franzoni et al. (2009) described the 
requirement for fine-grained access control in the Grid environment to support 
authorizations for flexible job scheduling. Aziz, Arenas, Martinelli, Matteucci, and Mori 
(2008) detailed the requirement for fine-grained access control in workflow systems in 
order to provide strong protection at the object level. Minami (2006) illustrated the need 
for fine-grained access control in order to provide flexible authorizations for mobile 
users. Steele, Gardner, and Dillon (2007) described the use of fine-grained access control 
to secure XML data stored in Web accessible repositories. Simpson (2008) discussed the 
emerging requirements for user-defined, fine-grained access control policies in social 
networks as a means to address privacy concerns. Cho et al. (2009) described an 
application of fine-grained access control that facilitates cloaking spatial data. Recently, 
Wang, Lui, and Wu (2010) and Zhao, Nishide and Sakuri (2011) described the use 
cryptography to implement fine-grained access control for cloud storage services. Wang, 
Xiang, Jing, and Zhang (2012) proposed the use of fine-grained access control as an 
approach to controlling security for Web browser extensions written in JavaScript. 
The capability to provide fine-grain access control is now available in a number 
of popular database products. In the commercial realm, Oracle
®
, IBM
®
, and Sybase
®
 
offer fine-grained access control as part of their respective database products (Kabra et 
al., 2006). The Oracle
®
 relational database management system provides fine-grained 
access control through a transparent query rewrite mechanism known as VPD. Version 9 
of the IBM
®
 DB2
®
 relational database product introduced a cell-level fine-grained access 
control mechanism known as LBAC (Bond et al., 2006). The Sybase EAServer database 
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system also offers a fine-grained access control capability based upon query rewrite, 
which is conceptually similar to the Oracle
®
 VPD (Kabra et al., 2006). 
Robbert and Ricardo (2003) found that undergraduate database courses typically 
allocate less than two hours per semester to the topic of database security. Thus, 
relatively few students are exposed to the theoretical foundations behind advanced 
security feature such as fine-grained access control. A further complicating factor is that 
fine-grained access control is a generic approach to providing enhanced database security 
and encompasses many disparate mechanisms. Significantly, oral tradition in the database 
community holds that the use of fine-grained access control in relational database 
management systems imposes significant performance penalties. This viewpoint appears 
to be supported by recent research. For example, Tolone, Ahn, Pai, and Hong (2005) 
described the use of role-based security in file-based collaborative systems as providing 
less overhead than fine-grained security at the user or object level. According to Tolone 
et al. (1992), the use of fine-grained access control adds complexity, is more difficult to 
manage, and is highly dependent upon contextual information encompassed within the 
data to be protected. However, Tolone et al. provided no supporting metrics for this 
generalization. Zhan et al. (2006) implemented a novel fine-grained access control model 
for one-variable queries under the PostgreSQL 7.4 relational database management 
system. Zhan et al. reported 20-30% degradation in query response time when employing 
a fine-grained access control mechanism based upon query modification. Zhu et al. 
(2008) evaluated a novel approach to fine-grained access control conceptually similar to 
the Hippocratic database implementation described by LeFevre et al. (2004). Zhu et al. 
measured performance degradation in excess of 25% for queries against large tables 
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using their approach to fine-grained access control termed the “Enforcing Rule”. In 
contrast, other studies, including LeFevre et al. (2004), Kabra et al. (2006), Zhu and Lü 
(2007), and Pan (2009), reported implementations of fine-grained access control for 
database systems with minimal performance impacts. 
According to LeFevre et al. (2004), query complexity is an important 
consideration in quantifying the performance of fine-grained access control. Both 
LeFevre et al. and Kabra et al. (2006) have identified query optimization (i.e., query 
simplification) as a factor that can significantly reduce the performance overhead 
inherent in fine-grained access control. In the study conducted by the author, an estimate 
of query complexity was employed as one of the independent variables during 
benchmarking trials. 
 
Barriers and Issues 
 
Rosenthal, Dittrich, Donahue, and Maimone (2001) described the general state of 
database security research as moribund. However, since 2001, there has been revived 
interest in database security research, motivated largely by privacy concerns and by the 
need to secure database systems accessed from the Internet (Zhu & Lü, 2007). Still, the 
total amount of research in this subject area of database security is somewhat sparse. 
Some of the most influential research papers on the topic of fine-grained access control, 
for example Agrawal et al. (2002), LeFevre et al. (2004), and Rizvi et al. (2004), 
originate from the early years of the previous decade. Nevertheless, the foundational 
work by these researchers continues to be relevant to current research, as seen for 
example in the work by Zhang (2008), Zhu et al. (2008), Siegenthaler and Birman (2009), 
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and Yu (2009). 
Agrawal et al. (2002) introduced the concept of the Hippocratic Database.  
LeFevre et al. (2004) in her seminal paper describing an implementation of the 
Hippocratic Database technology, focused not only on a pragmatic implementation of the 
technology, but also on the performance characteristics of Hippocratic Database 
technology. The work of LeFevre et al. received significant discussion and analysis in 
subsequent research work on fine-grained access control for database systems by Bertino 
et al. (2005), Kabra et al. (2006), Wang et al. (2007), Johnson and Grandison (2007), and 
Zhu et al. (2008). 
The seminal paper of Rizvi et al. (2004) was highly instrumental in generating 
renewed research interest in the area of fine-grained authorizations. Rizvi et al. proposed 
the Truman and Non-Truman models to describe the behavior of different approaches to 
fine-grained authorization. The concepts embodied in the Truman model have  influenced 
research in the area of fine-grained access control for database systems, as may be seen in 
the work of Purevjii, Aritsugi, Imai, and Kanamori (2007), Wang et al. (2007), Olson et 
al. (2008), Corcoran, Swamy, and Hicks (2009), and Zhang et al. (2009). As well, the 
concept of the Truman and Non-Truman models has influenced the development of fine-
grained authorizations for XML; this is reflected in the work of Kanza, Mendelzon, 
Miller, and Zhang (2006), Steele et al. (2007), and Currim et al. (2009). 
Although there is a considerable body of recent work focused on the issue of fine-
grained access control, the number of researchers pursuing topics in this field is relatively 
small. Thus, much of the literature referenced in the study was drawn from a relatively 
small group of researchers. Nevertheless, the research available on the topic of fine-
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grained access control is both relevant and important. Rosenthal and Winslett (2004) 
described concerns in the area of database security research as follows “…progress in 
data security has been slow, and (too) much security enforcement is in application code, 
or else is coarse grained and insensitive to data contents” (pp. 962).  
The study undertaken by the author provides new information concerning the 
performance and scalability of four common fine-grained access control mechanisms. 
This information should be of considerable benefits to database professionals and system 
architects looking to secure relational database management systems accessed from the 
Internet. In addition, information concerning the scalability of four common fine-grained 
access control systems should help address possible concerns about the use of this 
technology for real-world applications. The work undertaken in this study builds upon 
previous database security benchmarking as reported by LeFevre et al. (2004), Kabra et 
al. (2006), Zhu et al. (2006), and Zhu and Lü (2007). 
 
Limitations and Delimitations of the Study 
The study that was undertaken employed performance benchmarking as a 
mechanism for quantifying the performance cost imposed by database fine-grained access 
control. The intent was to measure the relative performance of relational database 
management systems that implemented fine-grained access control, compared against 
like configurations that did not employ fine-grained access control. According to Gray 
(1992), benchmarking is often employed as a methodology to quantify the performance 
of a computer system using just a single numerical value (e.g., transactions per second). 
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Metrics generated through the benchmarking process were the sole input used to 
formulate the generic performance model developed in the author’s study. 
Given that no generally accepted standard exists for the implementation of fine-
grained access control in relational database management systems, selection of the 
approaches to be evaluated were somewhat subjective. The four approaches selected for 
evaluation included authorization views, a Hippocratic Database, transparent query 
rewrite, and LBAC. These are the most commonly utilized approaches to fine-grained 
access control in database systems as described by Bertino et al. (2006), Wang et al., 
2007, and Zhu and Lü (2007).   
In the recent literature, a concept termed “correctness criteria” has been identified 
as an issue of significant importance (Rizvi et al, 2004; Bertino & Sandhu, 2005; Bertino 
et al, 2006; Wang et al., 2007). Correctness criteria pertain to the completeness of results 
retuned by database queries that are filtered by fine-grained access control. While the 
author recognizes the significance of correctness criteria, the generic model does not 
address this issue given that none of the approaches to fine-grained access control 
selected for evaluation currently satisfies the correctness criteria. Nor in fact are there any 
fine-grained access control mechanisms commonly in use today that satisfy the 
correctness criteria (Wang et al., 2007). 
A key question that was addressed in the author’s study concerns the issue of 
scalability. Do the performance characteristics of fine-grained access control 
implementations change significantly when load increases? Elnikety et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that it is possible to estimate database scalability using small-scale systems 
and the TPC-W benchmark. Others, including Vieira and Madeira (2005), Kabra et al. 
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(2006), and Zhu and Lü (2007) have evaluated TPC benchmarks on small-scale 
processors to measure the overhead imposed by security mechanisms. According to 
Menascé (2002), the TPC-W benchmark may also be used to estimate scalability, 
calculated as the ratio of concurrent sessions versus the cardinality of the ITEM table. 
The study undertaken utilized the TPC-W benchmark on a small-scale processor to derive 
metrics for use in formulation of a generic model. Benchmarking on large-scale systems 
is beyond the scope and resources of the current study.  
 
Definition of Terms 
The subject of database security employs a number of terms and phrases that have 
specific meanings within the field. Definitions for terms and phrases have been drawn 
primarily from textbooks and research papers. The classic textbook ‘Database Security’ 
(Castano, Fugini, Martella, & Samarati, 1994) provides an excellent general reference for 
many of the specific terms relating to database security. The following definitions are 
provided to clarify terms used in this document. 
Access Control The process of restricting access to data based upon 
a predefined access policy (Benantar, 2005). 
Authentication The process of uniquely identifying a system user 
(Castano et al., 1994) 
Authorization Also termed Access Authorization. Both terms are 
synonymous with Access Control (Benantar, 2005). 
Base Table A database structure created via the SQL CREATE 
TABLE statement and stored as an ordered file in 
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the Relational Database Management System is 
termed a base table. (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Benchmark The process of acquiring measurements for use in 
comparing performance between systems (Jain, 
1991). 
Cell In a relational table or spreadsheet, the intersection 
between a column and a row (cell, n.d.). 
Closed World An approach to database security that denies access 
to objects unless an authorization is explicitly 
specified (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005).  
Conditional Validity The concept that a query can be fully answered 
using data in a set of database views (Rizvi et al., 
2004). 
DBA Acronym for Database Administrator (Castano et 
al., 1994). 
Data Privacy Concerning the rights of individuals to determine 
how, when, and under what conditions personal 
information may be released (Agrawal et al., 2002). 
Data Security Data is said to be secure when the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the data can be ensured 
(Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). 
Execution Plan Describes how a SQL query is to be executed 
including access methods for each database object 
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as well as references to the internal algorithms used 
to implement SQL operators (Elmasri & Navathe, 
2010). 
Fine-grained In access control, referring to the granularity of 
access to data, also known as low-level access under 
conditions where access to data is restricted at the 
row, column, or cell level (Wang et al., 2007). 
Generic Model A paradigm used to illustrate concepts at a high 
level of abstraction using concise definitions 
(Melnik et al., 2003). 
Hippocratic Database A conceptual database architecture or design that 
facilitates data privacy (Agrawal et al., 2002). 
Index-Scan Accessing rows in a database table using an index 
(Garcia-Molina, Ullman, & Widom, 2008). 
INGRES® A prototype relational database management system 
implemented at the University of California between 
1975 and 1977 (Stonebraker & Rowe, 1986). 
Join The SQL JOIN operation combines rows from two 
tables based upon a column or columns common to 
both tables (i.e., join-predicates). A JOIN operation 
returns only the rows satisfying the JOIN condition. 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Label Commonly used as a synonym for “access class” in 
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the MAC model (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). 
Mechanism An implementation of a model, construct, or 
paradigm used to provide access control (Benantar, 
2005). 
Metadata Descriptive information about the database structure 
and database contents (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Middleware A shared application external to the database that 
provides database connectivity and related services 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Null A special data value employed to indicate that data 
contains no specific value (LeFevre et al., 2004). 
Performance A metric quantifying the work performed by a 
system – e.g., database transactions per second 
(Gray, 1992). 
Object A passive entity, for example, a table in a relational 
database management system (Benantar, 2005). 
ODBC An acronym for Open Data Base Connector – an 
industry standard for interfacing application 
software to relational database management systems 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Parse Tree A tree-like structure representing the lexical 
elements and syntactical categories of a SQL 
statement (Garcia-Molina et al., 2008). 
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Policy A rule used to control access (Castano et al., 1994). 
Query Optimization The assembly of a plan for executing a SQL query 
efficiently. The SQL query may be simplified as 
part of the assembly process. The term is a 
misnomer in that the optimized query is not 
necessarily optimal, merely adequately efficient 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Query Rewrite The process where the query parse tree is converted 
to an algebraic representation of the query (Garcia-
Molina et al., 2008). The primary function in query 
rewrite is to handle views, correctly eliminating 
duplicate statements, nested queries and NULLs 
(Hellerstein et al., 2007).  
Resource Encompasses both hardware and software (e.g., 
CPU, disks, program files). In terms of database 
access control, authorization for resources 
encompasses facilitating access to data and database 
stored procedures (Castano et al., 1994). 
Response Time The elapsed time between submission of the query 
and receipt of the query response (Elmasri & 
Navathe, 2010). 
Row-level security An approach to enforcing data access restrictions at 
the row level (Wang et al., 2007). Using row-level 
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enforcement, the entire row is prohibited from 
viewing even if only a single cell within the row 
contains confidential data (LeFevre et al., 2004). 
Scalable A solution that is equally applicable to small and 
large computer systems is said to be scalable (Gray, 
1992). 
SPEC An acronym for Standard Performance Evaluation 
Corporation. A nonprofit consortium of computer 
vendors that provides computer benchmark 
programs (Gray, 1992). 
SQL An acronym for Structured Query Language. SQL is 
the query language used in relational database 
management systems (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
Subject A term to identify a program in execution that has 
both and identity and privilege (Benantar, 2005). 
Synthetic Workload A workload with characteristics similar to real world 
processing that can be executed multiple times in a 
controlled fashion (Jain, 1991). 
System A general term that encompasses hardware, software 
and firmware (Jain, 1991).  
System R A prototype relational database management system 
developed by IBM
®
 during the 1970's (Astrahan et 
al., 1976). 
  
25 
TCB Acronym for Trusted Computing Base; defined as 
the components that enforce the security policy of a 
system (Bishop, 2002). 
Truman Model Named after the artificial world of Truman Burbank 
in the movie ‘The Truman Show’, the model 
provides “…each user with a personal and restricted 
view of the complete database” (Rizvi et al., 2004, 
p. 553).  
TPC Acronym for the Transaction Processing 
Performance Council. The TPC defines and audits 
performance and database benchmarks for industry 
(Transaction Processing Performance Council, 
1998). 
TPC-W The TPC Benchmark™ W (TPC-W) is designed to 
model an on-line bookstore (Transaction Processing 
Performance Council, 2003). 
User Typically a human being. A user is often associated 
with a user account or profile which contains both 
authentication and authorization information for the 
specific user (Benantar, 2005). 
Views Queries stored in the database catalog, expanded at 
run-time by the query rewriter, providing dynamic, 
virtual tables (Hellerstein et al., 2007). 
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View Replacement An approach in which the base relations in a query 
submitted by a user are replaced by authorized 
views (Kabra et al., 2006). 
Wisconsin Benchmark Developed in 1983 at the University of Wisconsin, a 
benchmark that is widely used to test the 
performance of relational database management 
systems (Gray, 1992). 
Workload A user request made to the system. A user can be 
either a person or a software program (Jain, 1991). 
 
 
Summary 
 
The problem that was studied in this dissertation concerns the performance 
penalties associated with the use of fine-grained access control in relational database 
management systems. By 1976, fine-grained access control capabilities had been 
implemented for both the INGRES
®
 and System R prototype relational databases 
(Griffiths & Wade, 1976). Yet despite the fact that more than 30 years have passed, 
database fine-grained access is not widely used, although the associated benefits of the 
technology have been well documented (Rizvi et al., 2004; Agrawal et al., 2007; 
Roichman & Gudes, 2007; Simpson, 2008; Currim et al., 2009). To date, relatively little 
known effort has been directed toward the performance issues associated with the use of 
fine-grained access control (Zhang, 2008). Still, some researchers believe that fine-
grained access control solutions for relational database management systems can provide 
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enhanced security as well as improved privacy protection with only minimal performance 
penalties (Yu, 2009). 
The study undertaken by the author led to the development of a generic model to 
represent the performance aspects of four approaches to fine-grained access control 
implemented within a relational database management system. The formulation of a 
generic model that quantifies the performance penalties associated with the use of fine-
grained access control in database systems is intended to provide database administrators 
and system architects with a much better understanding of the performance implications 
attendant with the use of these technologies. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
Salkind (2006) described the literature review as a chronological investigation of 
the development of ideas in the subject field, providing an opportunity to examine ideas 
that were proven true and those that “…were left by the wayside because of lack of 
support…” (p.43). Boote and Beile (2005) described the literature review as providing 
the researcher with an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of previous 
research, and an opportunity for critical analysis of past work. Sekaran (2003) described 
the objective of the literature review as the formulation of a research based foundation for 
the theoretical framework of the proposed study.  
The review of the literature is separated into six sections: the contribution of 
INGRES
®
 and System R, database access control concepts, relational query processing, 
fine-grained access control, performance benchmarking, and performance models. In the 
first section of the literature review, the author examines a number of the architectural 
decisions made in the INGRES
®
 and System R prototype databases that continue to have 
significant impact on modern relational database management systems. In the second 
section, the author reviews the technical concepts and paradigms that underlay database 
access control, focusing on concepts central to the implementation of fine-grained access 
control. In the third section, the author describes the processes behind relational query 
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processing, focusing in particular on the function of the database query rewriter, which is 
a critical component in determining the efficiency of fine-grained access control. In the 
fourth section of the literature review, the author reviews the current state of fine-grained 
access control for relational database management systems. In the fifth section of the 
literature review, the author examines the use of performance benchmarking for 
quantifying the efficiency of fine-grained access control implementations. In the sixth 
and final section of the literature review, the author examines the use of performance 
models as tools for quantifying database performance and scalability.  
  
The Contribution of INGRES
®
 and System R 
“Descendants of the early relational prototypes [INGRES® and System R] have 
become the primary commercial relational DBMSs” (Stonebraker, 2008, p. 76). This is 
not to imply that there have been no technical advancements in relational database 
technology since the mid-1970s. Rather, three decades of database research and 
commercial software development have advanced relational database technology to the 
point where relational database management systems are now ubiquitous and often 
considered mission-critical (Hellerstein et al., 2007). Still, it is worthy to note that market 
forces have provided the primary motivation for database research over the past three 
decades (Stonebraker, 2008). While advances in relational database technology have 
provided greatly enhanced reliability, scalability and many new database features, 
relatively few changes have been made to the underlying architecture of relational 
database management systems since the INGRES
®
 and System R prototype databases 
(Hellerstein et al.).  
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Stonebraker and Wong (1974) described the capability to deploy fine-grained 
access control in the INGRES
®
 prototype database using query rewrite. According to 
Stonebraker and Wong, the objectives in defining the access control system for the 
INGRES
®
 database were that such a system was to be powerful, flexible and impose 
minimal overhead in terms of processing requirements. Query rewriting is performed at 
the query language level, allowing queries to be filtered in order to exclude any rows the 
query is not authorized to return (Bertino et al., 2005). This approach to fine-grained 
access control is also known as row-level security or content-based access control 
(Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). Stonebraker and Wong leveraged the database query rewriter, 
an internal database subsystem used primarily for view compilation, in order to modify 
query statements without the knowledge of the user, thereby providing effective row-
level security. However, this approach to transparent query rewrite suffers from a 
significant problem in that the results returned from a database query may contain fewer 
rows than the user is actually authorized to view (Rizvi et al., 2004). Even so, transparent 
query rewrite continues to be used today. Oracle
®
 VPD, an access control mechanism 
available in the enterprise version of the Oracle
®
 relational database management system, 
employs transparent query rewrite in order to provide fine-grained access control (Currim 
et al., 2009). 
Query processing is another area where modern database systems retain a strong 
link to the System R prototype database. According to Deshpande, Ives, and Raman 
(2007), cost-based query optimization developed for System R continues to be used 
extensively in modern relational database management systems. Selinger, Astrahan, 
Chamberlin, Lorie, and Price (1979) described the query optimizer in System R as 
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incorporating the use of three categories of metadata for optimizing queries: cardinality 
estimates, execution plan cost estimates, and searches for optimal execution plans. 
According to Chaudhuri (2009), in spite of 30 years of continuous improvements, cost-
based query optimization continues to be based upon the System R “…query in, plan out 
model” (p. 967). However, Hellerstein et al. (2007) states that the work by Selinger et al. 
(1979) was preliminary research and therefore, most modern relational database 
management systems contain some optimizations in the areas of selectivity, search 
algorithms, and parallelism to address known limitations in the System R query 
optimizer. Further, Deshpande et al. cautioned that the System R style of query 
optimization could break down when provided with insufficient statistical information 
resulting in generation of optimizer errors at a rate exponential to the size of the query. 
View replacement using authorization views is a technique frequently employed 
to implement fine-grained access control in relational database management systems. 
Kabra et al. (2006) described view replacement as an approach where user queries are 
redirected to authorization views rather than being permitted as queries against base 
tables. According to Kabra et al., fine-grained access control that employs a view 
replacement model depends heavily on query optimization for good performance. 
Views in System R were introduced primarily as a means of providing read-only 
authorizations on tables; however, System R also allowed updates on views referencing a 
single underlying base table (Astrahan et al., 1976). Conceptually, a view in System R 
was a stored query, providing access to a subset of rows and columns on one table or 
series of joined tables (Blasgen et al., 1981). System R also introduced parameter driven 
authorization views, thereby providing a filtering mechanism for content-based 
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authorizations (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). Rizvi et al. (2004) described conventional 
authorization views, including authorization views incorporating dynamic parameter 
selection, as the “Truman Model” of fine-grained access control. Under the Truman 
Model, query results returned to the user may be incomplete. This condition is resolved in 
an alternate query model that Rizvi et al. described as the “Non-Truman Model”. 
Views were stored in the System R database in a format known as a pre-optimized 
package (Astrahan et al., 1976). The System R pre-optimized package was comprised of 
a SQL parse tree and a query execution plan (Astrahan et al.). For a query against a view 
in System R, the user-supplied query was merged with the stored parse tree using query 
rewrite (Blasgen et al., 1981). According to Bertino and Sandhu (2005), this approach, 
termed “view composition”, continues to be used in modern database systems. However, 
a side effect of view composition concerns inefficiencies that may be introduced when 
the SQL WHERE clause of the stored view and the SQL WHERE clause of the user 
query are combined (Bertino & Sandhu). Halevy (2001) indicated that the view 
composition approach works best when base tables referenced in the query fully intersect 
with a view referencing the same base tables. Otherwise, additional query rewriting may 
be required to eliminate redundant joins, thus resulting in increased query compilation 
and lengthy execution times (Kabra et al., 2006). 
The original user authorization subsystem in the System R database required that 
access to tables and views to be explicitly granted or revoked by the object owner or by a 
database administrator (Blasgen et al., 1981). Griffiths and Wade (1976) proposed an 
enhanced scheme of SQL based GRANT and REVOKE operations for tables and views 
in the System R database. The scheme proposed by Griffiths and Wade allowed access 
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privileges to be delegated to other users in order to streamline security management. This 
scheme of coarse-grained (e.g., table level authorizations) eventually evolved into what is 
now termed role-based access control (RBAC). According to Bertino and Sandhu (2005), 
by the mid-1990s, RBAC had become the standard for coarse-grained security in most 
relational database management systems. The use of roles provides flexible management 
of user authorizations. Under RBAC, object permissions are assigned to roles, and roles 
are assigned to users, thereby negating the onerous requirement that object permissions 
be assigned to individual database users (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). 
Denning, Akl, Heckman, Lunt, Morgenstern, and Neumann (1987) described a 
hierarchical view implementation for the System R database allowing classification of 
data and the enforcement of mandatory security. The approach described by Denning et 
al. (1987) employed database views as objects to which authorizations were applied. The 
hierarchical or multilevel approach described by Denning et al. for System R employed 
three sets of views:  
1. A base set of views classified data by security level – top-secret, secret, 
confidential, and unclassified; 
2. An intermediate sets of views served to classify aggregations of data that had 
a higher security classification than the constituent elements;  
3. A tertiary set of views that removed (filtered) data classified at a higher level 
than the access level of the user querying the data. 
The INGRES
®
 and System R databases were highly influential in establishing 
relational databases as the primary database technology of today (Garcia-Molina et al., 
2008). According to Bertino and Sandhu (2005), the System R discretionary access 
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control model and its extensions provide the basis for coarse-grained access control in 
modern relational database management systems. As well, the work by Denning et al. 
(1987) using the System R prototype database demonstrated a successful proof of concept 
deployment of mandatory access control in a relational database management system. 
Zhang (2008) noted that today, all major database vendors, including Oracle
®
, IBM
®
, and 
Microsoft
®
, currently provide mandatory access control mechanisms for their respective 
database products using LBAC. 
  
Access Control Concepts 
The internal protection of database systems is provided by the combination of 
three subsystems – authentication, authorization, and auditing (Castano et al., 1994). 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship of these three subsystems. The terms authorization 
and access control are considered synonymous, although the term authorization is much 
more widely used (Benantar, 2005). However, the term access control may also be 
employed in a broader context to describe the protection state of a system (Bishop, 2002). 
According to Bishop, “protection” describes the conditions “…under which a system is 
secure” (p. 31). Authentication is the first internal subsystem involved in protecting the 
database. In order to use services provided by a relational database management system, 
the user must first be authenticated (Castano et al., 1994). Bishop (2002) describes 
authentication as the process where an external entity, the user, must confirm their 
identity. In most cases, the term user is associated with a human being (Benantar, 2005). 
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Figure 1. Internal Protection of Database Systems (adapted from Benantar, 2005, p. 17) 
 
Authorization is the second internal subsystem involved in protecting the 
database. However, authorization cannot occur until authentication is successfully 
completed. According to Benantar (2005), authorization (also termed access control) is 
the process of granting user access to data based upon a security policy. By default, users 
should have no access to data until suitably authorized. This paradigm, where security 
policies only contain access condition but no prohibitions, is termed a closed world 
system or closed world model (Castano et al., 1994). Standard coarse-grained security in 
modern relational database management systems is implemented under a closed world 
model (Castano et al.). In contrast, fine-grained access-control supports the open world 
model, in which both access rights and access prohibitions may be explicitly specified in 
security policies (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). It is worth noting however, that closed world 
systems are typically considered more secure than open world systems as the 
authorization state is more easily verified (Castano et al.). 
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Auditing is the third internal subsystem used to protect the database. Audit logs 
are useful in identifying unauthorized transactions if database tampering is suspected 
(Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). Audit logs can be used in database systems to record both 
read and write operations, although there are practical constraints on the granularity of 
event logging imposed by log storage considerations (Castano et al., 1994). According to 
Bishop (2002), auditing is often considered external to the database protection model as 
auditing provides accountability, but does not directly protect data. 
Access control models can be classified into three broad categories: discretionary 
access control (DAC) models, mandatory access control (MAC) models, and role-based 
access control (RBAC) models (Bishop, 2002). DAC models provide an identity-based 
approach to security where the object owner has complete discretion over who may 
access an object (Benantar, 2005). However, DAC also allows the object owner to 
delegate access control responsibility on an object to other database users. MAC models 
classify both data and users based on security classes (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). MAC 
models restrict access of subjects to objects based on the use of hierarchical labels 
(Castano et al., 1994). RBAC models are employed to restrict access based upon job 
function (Bishop, 2002).  
Under DAC, an authorized user may grant or revoke access rights on objects to 
other system users (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). DAC for relational database management 
systems also embodies the concept of delegated administration using the SQL GRANT 
option (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). The flexibility inherent in the DAC model provides a 
de facto mechanism for decentralized administration of authorizations (Castano et al, 
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1994). However, this same flexibility is also an inherent weakness in the DAC model in 
that there are no controls on how access rights are propagated (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005).  
According to Castano et al. (1994), the underlying theoretical foundation of the 
DAC model is the access matrix model. Elmasri and Navathe (2010) describe the access 
matrix model as consisting of columns, which represent objects (e.g., base tables) and 
rows, which represent subjects (e.g., users). The intersection of a row and a column in the 
access matrix model, known as a cell, denotes the privileges of a subject with respect to 
an object (Bishop, 2002). The structure of the access matrix model can be logically 
extended to secure objects (e.g., tables and views) in a relational database (Castano et 
al.). Zhang (2008) provided the following description of the access matrix model applied 
to database security: “Each cell in the matrix has a flag indicating whether the user at that 
cell is able to read or update the corresponding data item” (p. 8). 
In contrast to the DAC model, the MAC model uses a mechanism termed the 
trusted computing base (TCB) for enforcement of access control (Benantar, 2005). The 
TCB encompasses all of the mechanisms, including hardware, software, and firmware, 
used to enforce security policies (Bishop, 2002). “Neither the subject, nor the owner of 
the object can determine whether access is granted” (Bishop, p. 104).  
The Bell-LaPadula model provides the theoretical foundation for the MAC model 
(Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). According to Castano et al., the combination of the simple 
security property and the star property in the Bell-LaPadula provides restrictions to 
ensure that data will never flow from a higher security level to a lower security level. 
MAC requires that objects be protected from unauthorized access as well as from 
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disclosure through unintended means such as flow violation and inference (Castano et al, 
1994).  
Under the MAC model, “…policies regulate access to data by subjects on the 
basis of predefined classification of subject and objects in the system” (Bertino & 
Sandhu, 2005, p. 9). MAC employs access classes, more commonly termed labels, as a 
mechanism for restricting access to data (Castano et al., 1994). The security label 
associated with the object is compared with the access class of the user in order to 
determine whether access to the object is permitted (Benantar, 2005). According to 
Bertino and Sandhu, fine-grained access control is supported in the MAC model with 
row-level labels. LBAC in Oracle
®
 and IBM
® 
conforms to the MAC model. 
Under RBAC, privileges are assigned to roles rather than to individuals (Elmasri 
& Navathe, 2010). A role is intended to be an abstract representation of a set of 
responsibilities, typically representing a job function (Bishop, 2002). Given that security 
policies are often formulated based on responsibilities or job functions, RBAC can be 
employed to generalize many real-world security requirements (Benantar, 2005).  
RBAC is the coarse-grained access control mechanism that is the default security 
provided by most modern relational database management systems (Elmasri & Navathe, 
2010). The strength of RBAC is that it can be employed to represent the hierarchical 
security requirement of real-world organizations (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005). However, 
RBAC can also support complex security implementations. According to Elmasri and 
Navathe, role-based access control can be used to represent both DAC and MAC models. 
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Relational Query Processing 
In order to be feasible, fine-grained access control requires efficient query 
processing, and in particular, requires efficient query optimization (Zhang, 2008). In 
Figure 2 the high-level architecture of a typical relational database management system is 
depicted, including the component sub-systems of the relational query processor. 
According to Garcia-Molina et al. (2008), the three major steps or phases of relational 
query processing include: 
1. Parsing – creating a parse tree representation of the SQL query;  
2. Query Rewrite – transforming the parse tree into a logical query plan; 
3. Plan Generation – converting the logical plan into a physical plan.  
In the parsing phase, the query is scanned, parsed, and validated. Elmasri and Navathe 
(2010) described scanning as the identification of SQL keywords, parsing as the process 
of checking the syntax of the SQL query, and validation as the process of confirming 
access to database objects referenced in the SQL query. Once the parse tree has been 
created, the query is optimized. According to Garcia-Molina et al., the query rewrite and 
physical plan generation phases of SQL query compilation are collectively known as 
query optimization. The process of query optimization is the most crucial and time-
consuming component of query processing in a relational database management system 
(Chaudhuri, 2009).  
Deshpande et al. (2007) stated that effective query optimization depends upon the 
presence of a stable execution environment and sufficient statistical information collected 
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Figure 2. Relational Database Architecture (adapted from Hellerstein et al., 2007, p. 14 
 
 
for base tables and indexes. During the optimization process, only data in the database 
catalog (i.e., metadata) is available to the query optimizer (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
This metadata includes table size (cardinality), related indexes, data location on disk, and 
frequency of table attributes (Garcia-Molina et al., 2008).  
 
 
Figure 3. Example TPC-W Query Execution Plan 
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A query execution plan generated by the database optimizer provides a data-flow 
like representation of the database query as depicted in Figure 3. In Figure 3, the TPC-W 
“Subject-Search” SQL query is decomposed showing the two constitute tables, ITEM and 
AUTHOR. The “Nested Loop” symbol depicted in Figure 3 indicates that a join 
operation between ITEM and AUTHOR is effected with the ITEM table forming the 
outer loop and the AUTHOR table the inner loop (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). Figure 3 
also indicates that the join of the AUTHOR table to ITEM utilizes the table primary key 
(i.e., author_pkkey). The query is limited to the first 50 rows returned as indicated by the 
“Limit” symbol in Figure 3. Although an ORDER BY clause is included in the SQL 
query, a separate sort operation is not required in this particular instance as the ITEM 
table is read in descending primary key (i.e., sorted) order. 
According to Hellerstein et al. (2007), each query block in the query execution 
plan is optimized separately. The calculated cost of each block in the query execution 
plan is used to determine the cost of the complete query (Hellerstein et al.). According to 
Elmasri and Navathe (2010), the efficiency of the execution strategy selected is based on 
the execution plan cost, which is an estimated value, not a measured value. Elmasri and 
Navathe noted that the query optimization strategy selected by the query optimizer is not 
necessarily the optimum execution strategy, merely one that is reasonably efficient, albeit 
suboptimal. However, Chaudhuri (2009) described the current generation of relational 
database query optimizers as producing a surprising large number of optimal query plans. 
Reddy and Harista (2005) noted that query plan efficiency (i.e., which plans are deemed 
optimal) is decided primarily based upon the estimated query response time. On the other 
hand, Chaudhuri noted that the use of parameterized queries, such as those employed in 
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some authorization views, could result in the constant regeneration of query execution 
plans due to changes in the underlying data. As well, Helerstein et al. (2007) noted that 
the run-time characteristics of parameterized queries could vary significantly depending 
upon whether parameter values at run-time are typical of the parameter values employed 
during the initial compilation of the parameterized authorization view. 
In addition to graphical query execution plans, a cost-based analysis can also be 
generated for individual queries in text format as depicted in Figure 4 for the TPC-W 
subject-search query. Kabra et al. (2006) employed query cost analysis to estimate
 
Figure 4. Cost analysis of TPC-W Query 
 
 
query complexity for implementations of fine-grained access control. Both Kabra et al. 
and LeFevre et al. (2004) manually simplified SQL queries to reduce complexity (i.e., 
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reduce the cost of query execution) as part of implementing efficient fine-grained access 
control mechanisms in their respective fine-grained access control implementations for 
SQL Server
®
 and DB2
®
. However, it was explicitly understood by both authors that the 
database query optimizer would further revise their simplified SQL statements prior to 
execution. 
 
Database Fine-Grained Access Control 
For maximum effectiveness, fine-grained access control should be an integral part 
of the database software, rather than custom code developed as part of an individual 
application (Rizvi et al., 2004). Providing fine-grained access control at the database 
level ensures that all access to the database is subject to the same access control regime 
(Wang et al., 2007). As well, fine-grained access control implemented within a relational 
database management system is far more difficult to subvert than fine-grained access 
control implemented externally through custom application code (Zhu & Lü, 2007). 
Further, if fine-grained control exists only at the application level or middleware level, 
the entire database may be subject to compromise (Kabra et al., 2006). 
Enforcement of fine-grained access control involves two components – a 
mechanism and a security policy (Siegenthaler & Birman, 2009). A mechanism is a 
process to enforce security policies (He & Yang, 2009). In more specific terms, “An 
access control mechanism refers to a particular method, tool, or procedure for 
implementing an access control policy” (Benantar, 2005, p. 26). In the context of access 
control, a security policy comprises a set of rules (Benantar, 2005). Using the information 
specified in a security policy, an access control mechanism either grants or denies user 
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access to data (Kocaturk & Gundem, 2008). However, the security policy must be 
sufficiently fine-grained to express all access control requirements (Fischer, Marino, 
Majumdar, & Millstein, 2009). On the other hand, Bell (2005) cautions that the 
granularity of a security policy can be no greater than the granularity supported by the 
algorithms underlying the access control mechanism.  
Zhang (2008) noted that the use of fine-grained access control in relational 
database management systems imposes performance issues. According to Kabra et al. 
(2006), most of the existing approaches to fine-grained access control, including existing 
commercial implementations, effectively replace a query on a base table with a query on 
a view of the base table in order to remove unauthorized data. This category of 
mechanism is termed a view-based or view replacement approach. According to Zhang, 
the view-based approach imposes additional overhead in query processing due to the 
requirement to rewrite user queries to enforce fine-grained access control.  
Zhang (2008) identified three areas in query compilation and query processing 
where the use of fine-grained access control imposes additional overhead:  
1. Query rewriting to enforce fine-grained access control changes the query 
semantic structure, producing a query plan that is potentially less optimal than 
the original; 
2. The view-based approach to removing unauthorized data imposes additional 
complexity on the user query. With the added complexity, the query optimizer 
needs to determine the cardinality of both the original query and the rewritten 
query with fine-grained access controls enforced. 
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3. At run-time, additional authorization checks are required due to the user query 
being rewritten to enforce fine-grained access control. 
Figure 5 depicts the query evaluation steps that take place when fine-grained access 
control is absent and when fine-grained access control is implemented. According to 
Zhang, cardinality is one of the most important factors affecting query performance when 
fine-grained access control is implemented. Zhang, Ilyas, and Salem (2009) describe 
Partitioned Sampling for Multiple users (PSALM), a technique that improves query  
 
 
Figure 5. Query Evaluation in Relational Databases (adapted from Zhang, 2008, p. 3) 
 
performance under systems that implement fine-grained access control. Zhang et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that query efficiency under fine-grained access control could be 
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improved if the cardinality of accessible rows can be estimated with a high degree of 
accuracy at the time the query is compiled. 
 Parameter driven authorization views conforming to the Truman model are useful 
in constructing dynamic views that can be embedded in Web applications (Rizvi et al., 
2004; Roichman & Gudes, 2007). However, authorization views may incur additional 
overhead at run-time as dynamic parameters provided through user input may contain 
values substantially different than the estimated values stored in the database at the time 
the authorization view was originally compiled (Hellerstein et al., 2007). As well, 
separate authorization views may be required for SQL SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and 
DELETE operations (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005; Kabra et al., 2006). According to Bertino 
and Sandhu, providing sufficient fine-grained security within an application may require 
multiple versions of authorization views to be maintained, which thus limits the 
practicality of authorization views as a general approach to fine-grained access control. 
A common approach to enforcing privacy protection at the cell level involves 
replacing restricted attributes with a “null” value (Bertino et al., 2005). Null is a special 
value in standard SQL, generally assumed to indicate that the attribute has no defined 
value (Garcia-Molina et al., 2008). However, according to LeFevre et al. (2004), null 
may also be employed to indicate absence of an attribute; for example, a null might 
appear in a column containing phone numbers to indicate that no telephone was installed. 
Further, null cannot be used as a value in a primary key, an issue that may limit the 
applicability of nullification as a data masking technique (LeFevre et al.). According to 
Zhu et al., (2008), in nullifying cells containing sensitive data, the act of nullification 
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itself indicates that sensitive information exists in the original data, providing possible 
incentive for further attacks. 
Garcia-Molina et al. (2008) identified a number of considerations associated with 
the use of nulls in ANSI Standard SQL. According to Garcia-Molina et al., these 
considerations include: 
1. SQL operations using outer joins may return nulls where no values exist; 
2. Comparing a null value to any other value, including another null value, 
evaluates to unknown; 
3. The proper method to determine whether a cell contains a null value is to 
employ the IS NULL operator, which returns a Boolean TRUE or FALSE. 
Kabra et al. (2006) discussed the performance issues associated with the use of 
nullification when used for privacy enforcement. The key issue identified by Kabra et al. 
concerns the impact of query rewrite on the original query and the likelihood that 
redundant authorization checks will be appended to the rewritten query. However 
LeFevre et al. (2004) found that while outer joins used to implement nullification for 
privacy protection can be inefficient, the judicious use of secondary indexing could 
negate some performance concerns. In addition, LeFevre et al. found that for large I/O 
bound queries, for example queries executed against large tables, the privacy-checking 
component of the query is a CPU intensive process, and thus can be addressed effectively 
through processor scaling. Significantly, the process of query simplification, as for 
example in the tuning of authorization views, can sometimes result in better performance 
than provided by the query plan of the original query (LeFevre et al.; Kabra et al.). 
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Rizvi et al. (2004) introduced the concept of unconditional validity when dealing 
with authorization views. According to Rizvi et al., unconditional validity requires that 
data returned from an authorization view be identical to data returned from the same 
query executed directly on the base table or tables. Rizvi et al. proposed the Truman and 
Non-Truman models of fine-grained access control based upon validity of query results 
returned. According to Bertino et al. (2005), the Truman model may not always return 
complete results and is therefore conditionally valid, whereas the Non-Truman model is 
unconditionally valid as it always returns complete query results. 
Bertino et al. (2005) proposed that an algorithm used to enforce fine-grained 
access control should be sound, secure, and maximum. Wang et al. (2007) termed these 
three properties “correctness criteria” (p. 555). According to Bertino et al., fine-grained 
access control should always return information that is accurate (sound), should not 
contain unauthorized information (secure), and should return all authorized rows 
(maximum). Wang et al. argued that most query modification algorithms used to 
implement fine-grained access control fail to meet the correctness criteria. 
The topic of correctness criteria is an active area of research relating to the use of 
fine-grained access control. Zhu et al. (2008) demonstrated that inclusion of the SQL 
operators NOT IN and NOT EXISTS in a sub-query can cause additional (i.e., incorrect) 
information to be returned by the sub-query, resulting in information leakage, thus 
violating the soundness property. Shi et al. (2009) examined SQL queries used in fine-
grained access control and provided a generalization for the soundness property using a 
relational algebra based analysis technique. Rastogi, Suciu, and Welbourne (2008) 
examined the need for fine-grained access control in radio frequency identification 
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(RFID) data management, stating that in order to address the soundness property, fine-
grained support for both access and deny security policies is required. 
Authorization Views 
To enforce restricted access to data, authorization views are the most commonly 
employed alternative to allowing unrestricted access to base tables in the database. 
Authorization views can be constructed using conventional SQL view syntax and may 
include dynamic parameters that are resolved when the view is executed (Rizvi et al., 
2004). Using authorization views, user queries are written against a view rather than 
against the base table, so that the user query only returns data the user is authorized to 
view (Kabra et al., 2006). As noted by Kabra et al., authorization views may also include 
a mechanism for authorization checks, which can potentially introduce inefficiencies, 
thereby resulting in increased query optimization overhead and slower query execution. 
However, the most significant source of inefficiency when using authorization views 
relates to the process of view instantiation. Hellerstein et al. (2007) noted that compiled 
views are stored in the database catalog along with a query execution plan generated at 
the time of view compilation. However, the data underlying the view may change 
significantly over time, resulting in poor query performance. Significant data changes 
affecting query execution could include changes in table cardinality as well as changes in 
attribute frequency (Garcia-Molina et al., 2008).  
Another source of inefficiencies relates to the structure of the SQL statement in 
authorization views. Hellerstein et al. (2007) warned that although authorizations on 
views are verified at the time of view compilation, they must also be checked again at the 
time of query execution, adding additional overhead. According to Kabra et al. (2006), 
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even though authorization views are pre-compiled, they can incur significant 
performance penalties at execution time. 
 Kabra et al. (2006) also noted that authorization checks incorporated in 
authorization views might be re-written by the query optimizer to include the use of SQL 
semi-joins. A SQL semi-join between two table is constructed using either the EXISTS or 
IN comparison operator and a nested sub-query. A SQL semi-join can be quite efficient if 
the nested sub-query returns only a small number of rows (Elmasri & Navathe, 2010). 
However, Dietrich (2001) warned that SQL queries incorporating nested sub-queries 
generally incur more overhead than SQL queries constructed without nesting.  
 Bertino et al. (2005) commented that the use of authorization views for fine-grained 
access control is potentially a naïve solution in that a great many authorization views may 
be required to implement the desired level of granularity for access control. However, 
Rizvi et al. (2004) proposed the use of parameterized authorization views as a means of 
reducing the number of authorization views required to provide fine-grained access 
control for an application. An example of the SQL code for a parameter driven 
authorization view is depicted in Figure 6. The $user-id run-time parameter shown in the 
SQL statement in Figure 6 always contains the user-id of the user executing the database 
query (Astrahan et al., 1976). Roichman and Gudes (2007) proposed the use of parameter 
driven authorization views to provide fine-grained access control for Web applications.  
 
Figure 6. Parameterized View under the Truman Model (adapted from Rizvi et al., 2004) 
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Transparent Query Rewriting 
Stonebraker and Wong (1974) were the first to describe the use of transparent 
query rewrite for fine-grained access control based upon the following principles: 
1. The user interacts with the data through a high-level query language; 
2. The database engine transparently modifies the query without the knowledge 
of the user in order to eliminate unauthorized data; 
3. The modified query statements are simplified for execution by the database. 
Efficient query rewrite depends upon effective query optimization. According to 
Hellerstein et al. (2007), query optimization is among the most complex functions 
performed in modern day commercial databases. In modern relational database 
management systems, both Oracle
®
 and Sybase
®
 employ transparent query rewrite to 
provide fine-grained access control (Kabra et al., 2006). Oracle
®
 VPD is the most 
frequently cited example of fine-grained access control using transparent query rewrite 
(Zhang, 2008).  
Under Oracle
®
 VPD, when a user query is issued, the SQL WHERE clause of the 
query is modified through the addition of predicates. According to Shi et al. (2009), 
predicates selected are based upon security policies defined as part of the VPD 
configuration. Currim et al. (2009) described this combination of policy and enforcement 
mechanism as providing “…a query that is in effect evaluated on a user’s private view of 
the data” (p. 40). Hence Oracle® describes this approach to fine-grained access control as 
a virtual private database (VPD). 
According to Oracle Corporation (2010), “To implement Oracle® Virtual Private 
Database, you must create a function to generate the dynamic WHERE clause, and a 
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policy to attach this function to the objects that you want to protect” (p.7-4). Although 
only available in the Enterprise Edition of the Oracle
®
 relational database management 
system, VPD can be used to protect tables, views, and synonyms. Oracle Corporation 
describes the operation of VPD as follows: 
1. When the user connects to a VPD enabled database, a log-on trigger fires to 
load a security policy into the user memory space – this is the VPD security 
context, which can be examined through a database view; 
2. The security policy (security context) can be applied to SQL SELECT, 
INSERT, UPDATE, and DELETE operations on both tables and views; 
3. When the user issues a SQL command to access an object protected by VPD, 
a predicate is appended to the WHERE clause of the SQL statement; 
4. The predicate in the WHERE clause is tested against each row in the table 
before access is granted.  
Wang et al. (2007) noted that in Oracle
®
 VPD, sensitive attribute values returned 
in the query are masked with NULL values as opposed to simply excluding the entire row 
as would be the case in a conventional row-level security deployment. According to 
Zhang et al. (2008), a query under Oracle
®
 VPD is “…rewritten and answered under the 
Truman model” (p. 19). Bertino et al. (2005) indicated that the Oracle® VPD is a more 
scalable technology than authorization views due to the dynamic nature of the VPD 
technology. Although Oracle
®
 VPD is primarily considered as a row-level security 
implementation, Bertino et al. (2005) indicated that VPD could also be employed for 
fine-grained column level security.  
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Hippocratic Databases 
Agrawal et al. (2002) introduced the concept of the Hippocratic Database. Just as 
the Hippocratic Oath directs physicians to preserve the privacy of patient information, 
privacy-preserving policies stored in the Hippocratic Database provide rules that are used 
to control access to personal information. The need for privacy preservation provided by 
Hippocratic Databases is motivated by the emergence of new and increasingly more 
stringent privacy legislation in the European Union, the United States, Canada, and 
Australia (Johnson & Grandison, 2007).  
The Hippocratic Database proposed by Agrawal et al. (2002) is primarily a 
conceptual approach to improving database security. Hippocratic Databases are 
configured using conventional relational database management systems with the addition 
of a SQL-based query modification mechanism that enforces security policies stored in 
database tables. In the Hippocratic Database, it is the implementation of the security 
policy store and relational joins to policy tables that are of the most concern in terms of 
quantifying query performance costs (LeFevre et al., 2004). According to Agrawal et al., 
the conceptual elements of the Hippocratic Database may also include such components 
as a policy editor, a data retention manager, a data collection analyzer, and a query 
intrusion detector. The provision of auditing to confirm privacy enforcement is also a 
feature of the Hippocratic Database (Agrawal et al., 2007). 
LeFevre et al. (2004) evaluated the performance of two implementations of a 
Hippocratic Database using the Wisconsin benchmark. In the work reported by LeFevre 
et al., the effect on query performance was measured for five variables: privacy 
enforcement mode, database size, query filtering, enforcement model, and query 
  
54 
structure. Experiments were performed using small-scale server hardware and the DB2
®
 
relational database management system. According to LeFevre et al., acceptable but 
statistically significant performance degradation was apparent when privacy protection 
was enforced using a Hippocratic Database.  
LeFevre et al. (2004) evaluated two separate approaches to SQL coding for 
implementing Hippocratic Database systems. In the first approach, a SQL CASE  
 
Figure 7. Query using CASE Statement (adapted from LeFevre et al., 2004, p. 113) 
 
 
statement containing a sub-select was used to filter results returned. In the example 
provided in Figure 7, if the value of the privacy flag is one, then the stored value for 
phone number is returned. If the value of the privacy flag is zero, then a NULL (i.e., no 
defined value) is returned, thereby masking the true value for the phone number. In the 
second approach described by LeFevre et al., and as depicted in Figure 8, a sub-select and  
 
Figure 8. Query using Outer JOIN (adapted from LeFevre et al., 2004, p. 114) 
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an outer join to a second data table are employed rather than an inline CASE statement. 
Based upon the value of the privacy flag, the LEFT OUTER JOIN returns either the 
stored value for the phone number or a NULL value. 
In addition, LeFevre et al. evaluated two separate configurations for storing 
privacy enforcement metadata. In one configuration, the privacy metadata was stored in 
base tables by appending privacy metadata columns to the base table. In the second 
configuration described by LeFevre et al., privacy metadata was stored in separate tables 
used only for metadata. According to LeFevre et al., use of a SQL CASE statement, 
combined with storage of privacy metadata in base tables, generally provides the best 
performance – however, to satisfy complex privacy requirements, queries employing 
complex joins to external metadata tables may be more efficient.  
Johnson and Grandison (2007) described an implementation of the Hippocratic 
Database technology using a middleware component dubbed “Active Enforcement”. The 
Active Enforcement middleware is not tied to a specific database technology and is thus 
intended to work with any relational database management system. According to Johnson 
and Grandison, the Active Enforcement approach moves coding of fine-grained access 
control out of the application and into a common middleware layer. The middleware 
approach also provides the capability to integrate other security tools such as audit and 
intrusion detection capability (Agrawal et al, 2007). However, Johnson and Grandison 
did not discuss performance costs related to deploying Active Enforcement. As well, 
Roichman and Gudes (2007) noted that fine-grained access control implemented through 
a middleware layer is typically less effective than fine-grained access control 
implemented directly within the database. 
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Label Based Access Control 
LBAC is a fine-grained access control implementation available in Oracle
®
, 
DB2
®
, and SQL Server
®
 (Zhang, 2008). Corcoran et al. (2009) described LBAC in 
Oracle
®
 and DB2
®
 as “…lattice-ordered labels for implementing row-level security” (p. 
280). LBAC is a mandatory access control implementation where security labels are 
employed to restrict the access of subjects to objects (Castano et al., 1994). LBAC is 
implemented within the database, providing a means to control access to sensitive data by 
tagging data with a data label (Oracle Corporation, 2009).  
LBAC in DB2
®
 enforces the policy that only a database security administrator 
may define a security policy (Bond et al., 2006). In DB2
®,
 the role of the database 
security administrator is completely separate from the role of the database administrator 
(DBA) – this approach enforces separation of duties. With DB2®, security labels may be 
stored as arrays (ordered elements), sets (unordered elements), or as trees, using a 
hierarchical structure. Where security label hierarchies exist, the database enforces the 
access order. 
Rask, Rubin, and Neumann (2005) described an LBAC implementation for the 
Microsoft SQL Server
® 
relational database management system. According to Rask et al. 
(2005), fine-grained access control for SQL Server
®
 is provided at the row-level using a 
view-based mechanism, which is implemented as follows:  
1. Labels are assigned  using standard role-based security;   
2. Five dedicated system tables are provided for label management;  
3. Views join base tables with system tables containing security labels;  
4. Users may only access views – direct access to base tables is denied.  
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Fine-grained access control at the cell level is implemented in SQL Server
®
 using 
encryption. According to Rask et al., a symmetric key is defined for each unique label; 
cells containing encrypted data must be accessed through a view that includes calls to 
decryption procedures stored in the database. As described by Rask et al., data in 
encrypted cells is only available to label holders with access to decryption keys. In SQL 
Server
®
, encryption and decryption is based upon the use of certificates and keys stored 
within the database. According to Rask et al., a thoroughly tested combination of views, 
database stored procedures, and triggers should be employed to manage the data 
encryption and decryption operations in order to ensure the security of user data. 
Other Approaches to Fine-Grained Access Control 
In addition to research that aligns with the view replacement model of fine-
grained access control, a number of novel approaches to fine-grained access control have 
recently been investigated. Current research in this area falls into three broad categories: 
extensions to role-based access control, extensions to standard SQL, and use of 
encryption for fine-grained access control. However, regardless of the approach, Yu 
(2009) warns that providing fine-grained access control for modern database systems 
must also provide good performance. 
Goyal, Pandey, Sahai, and Waters (2006) described a novel use of encryption to 
enforce fine-grained access control. In the scheme described by Goyal et al., data is 
stored in an encrypted form in conjunction with unencrypted security policies specifying 
the parties permitted to decrypt the data. However, in the work described by Goyal et al., 
only the performance implications of encryption/decryption methods are considered. 
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Performance considerations related to the complete end-to-end fine-grained access 
control solution were not evaluated. 
Manjhi et al. (2006) examined the issue of query invalidation where the data 
underlying the query is encrypted and stored remotely by a database scalability service 
provider (DSSP). Under high demand conditions, Web-based applications can redirect 
read-only queries from the database directly linked to the application, to a database 
operated by the DSSP. According to Manjhi et al., a typical DSSP may store data from 
multiple customers in a single database, using data encryption to ensure that individual 
customer data remains private. In the DSSP model, updates are applied only against the 
database directly linked to the application (i.e., the master database, not the DSSP 
database). Thus, when the master database is updated, the read-only data cached by the 
DSSP must be invalidated and refreshed from the master. Of particular interest in the 
work reported by Manjhi et al. was the use of the TPC-W benchmark to estimate database 
scalability in a DSSP environment. 
Tjan (2006) described an approach to database security that combined fine-
grained access control and role-based access control. The approach described by Tjan 
required storage of both identity and access rules as part of the user data in order to 
facilitate fine-grained access control. According to Tjan, when injecting fine-grained 
access control information into the role-based access control system, the granularity of 
role-based access control was improved. At the same time, the security context payload 
associated with each row in a table could be reduced. Conflicts between the two access 
control mechanisms were resolved through rule ordering. Although simulation was used 
by Tjan to evaluate the efficiency of combining fine-grained access control and role-
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based access control, results were presented in terms of complexity, and no specific 
performance metrics were provided. 
Olson et al. (2008) described a novel approach to database fine-grained access 
control termed Reflective Database Access Control (RDBAC). The approach described 
by Olson et al. employed an approach conceptually similar to VPD in an Oracle
®
 
database. According to Olson et al., leveraging contextual information stored as part of 
end-user data is superior to the coarse-grained security hierarchy provided through 
standard SQL in relational database management systems. Olson et al. implemented a 
prototype system written in Prolog on a small-scale server, and evaluated the 
performance cost of RDBAC using query execution times as the base metric.   
Chaudhuri et al., (2007) proposed an extension to SQL GRANT and REVOKE 
statements to allow predicates to be appended to the respective statements. For example, 
a WHERE clause appended to a SQL GRANT statement could provide a suitable 
mechanism for implementing row-level security. As well, the same SQL extensions 
proposed by Chaudhuri et al. could also provide attribute filtering at the column level, 
attribute filtering at the cell level, and fine-grained authorizations for database-stored 
procedures. The SQL extensions proposed by Chaudhuri et al. are conceptually similar to 
a strategy for fine-grained access control proposed by Agrawal et al., 2005. However, 
where Agrawal et al. proposed a novel approach, the proposal by Chaudhuri et al. was 
based upon simple extensions to standard SQL. Thus, the solution proposed by 
Chaudhuri et al. could be easily applied to both new and existing applications.  
Majedi et al. (2009) proposed extending the SQL GRANT and REVOKE 
statements to allow optional references to privacy policies that implement restrictions 
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such as purpose, generalization, visibility, and retention. The proposal by Majedi et al. is 
conceptually similar to the proposal of Chaudhuri et al. (2007) although the mechanism 
to provide fine-grained access control differs significantly between the two proposals. 
While, both proposals are based upon extensions to standard SQL, the proposal by 
Majedi et al. potentially provides better granularity for privacy protection because of the 
greater flexibility provided by policy-based grammar. According to Majedi et al., social 
networks along with e-Business, e-Government, and e-Health would benefit from 
relatively simple extensions to standard SQL. However, the proposal Majedi et al. was 
restricted to a conceptual model; a prototype was not constructed and the performance 
implications of extending standard SQL to include policy-based grammar were not 
examined. 
Pun et al. (2009) proposed extensions to standard SQL at the table level to support 
privacy policies in social networking applications. Similar to the proposal of Majedi et al. 
(2009), the extensions proposed by Pun et al. were based on privacy policy restrictions. 
However, Pun et al. proposed that the restrictions be implemented directly on physical 
tables rather than through SQL GRANT and REVOKE statements. Implementation at the 
table level would allow the same mechanism to be used for both DAC and MAC security 
models. According to Pun et al., most social networking sites, for example Facebook
®
, 
Flickr
®
, and MySpace
®
, delegate responsibility for enabling privacy controls to the user 
community, often resulting in minimal or inconsistent privacy protection. The approach 
suggested by Pun et al. is intended as a simple, cost-effective mechanism to enforce 
privacy policies at the system level. Pun et al. chose not evaluate the performance 
implications of their proposed extensions to standard SQL grammar. 
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Simpson (2008) examined the requirements for flexible fine-grained security in 
social networking environments like Facebook
®
 and LinkedIn
®
. According to Simpson, 
there are three key privacy principles for social networking sites: 
1. Data owners should be responsible for identifying privacy requirements; 
2. Fine-grained security is required because the privacy requirements of data 
owners are difficult to predict in advance and may change over time; 
3. Data owners should be provided with a listing of who has accessed their data.  
According to Simpson, lack of control over data sharing in social networks should be 
addressed by enhancing user-controlled authorizations. Simpson modeled privacy 
policies for social networks using the mathematical language Z, which employs SQL like 
syntax and predicates. Qamar, Ledru, and Idani (2011) validated Simpson’s approach, to 
security modeling by demonstrating the practicality of employing the Z language as a 
generalized tool for validating security models.  However, Simpson also recognized that 
social and legal solutions, in addition to technical solutions, might be required to ensure 
adequate data privacy for social networking sites. Simpson did not address performance 
issues associated with his proposed approach to fine-grained authorizations for social 
networks.  
Slaymaker, Power, Russell, and Simpson (2008), and He and Yang (2009) 
described policy-driven frameworks useful for secure collaboration in healthcare systems. 
Slaymaker et al., and He and Yang separately explored the use of Web services (i.e., a 
middleware approach) as a mechanism for enforcing fine-grained access control. 
However, their respective proposals were largely theoretical, and did not consider the 
performance characteristics of their respective approaches to fine-grained access control. 
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Abramov, Anson, Dahan, Shoval, and Sturm (2012) proposed the use of embedded 
security policies within the database for fine-grained access control. Abramov et al. 
(2012) employed model-based security patterns implementing RBAC but including fine-
grained constraints to provide row-level security at both the organizational and 
application level. Abramov et al. described a prototype implementation of the model 
employing the Oracle
®
 database and proprietary database stored procedures typically 
used to implement Oracle
®
 VPD. 
 
Benchmarking 
 
According to Kalibera and Tuma (2006), “One of the principal approaches to 
evaluating performance is benchmarking, where the system under test executes a model 
task, called benchmark, and the observed performance is used for the evaluation” (p. 63). 
Jain (1991) in the classic text “The Art of Computer Systems Performance Analysis” 
defined benchmarking as the commonly applied process of acquiring measurements for 
use in comparing performance between systems. Jain described the benchmarking 
process as encompassing the execution of one or more workloads (also termed 
benchmarks) in order to measure system performance. Gray (1992) introduced the 
concept of a domain-specific benchmark. According to Gray, a domain-specific 
benchmark “…specifies a synthetic workload characterizing typical applications in that 
problem domain” (p. 3). As described by Jain, synthetic workloads are comprised of 
fixed data sets containing elements that are representative of real-world data. However, 
synthetic data sets may also be used as an approach to anonymize real-world data in order 
to provide privacy protection (Wilson & Rosen, 2003).  
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Figure 9 depicts the concept of a benchmark hierarchy as described by Menascé and 
Almeida (2001). According to Menascé and Almeida, a benchmark hierarchy consists of 
benchmarks of varying complexity that range from basic benchmarks to very complex, 
domain-specific benchmarks. Jain (1991) described two well-defined categories of 
domain-specific benchmarks – the TPC business focused benchmarks and the Standard 
Performance Evaluation Corporation (SPEC) scientific and engineering application 
benchmarks. These domain-specific benchmarks continue to be widely used today, 
although individual benchmarks within these two domains have evolved significantly 
since they were introduced in the 1990’s. 
 
Figure 9. Benchmark Hierarchy (adapted from Menascé and Almeida, 2001, p. 266) 
 
Formal benchmarks like TPC and SPEC are executed in tightly controlled 
environments and the results are subject to audit and verification prior to publication 
(Transaction Processing Performance Council, 1998). Carefully controlled and audited 
benchmark statistics are useful for comparing competing vendor products in the 
commercial environment (Gray, 1992). However, most commercial software license 
agreements contain clauses prohibiting publication of benchmark results that are obtained 
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without the explicit permission of the respective software vendor (Reed, 2006). 
Therefore, many researchers opt to use open source database software when conducting 
performance benchmarking in order to avoid potential software copyright violations or 
conflicts with software license agreements (Gonzalez, 2006).  
A number of researchers have used the TPC benchmark to quantify the 
performance costs of fine-grained access control (Kabra et al., 2006; Zhu et al., 2006; 
Zhu & Lü, 2007; He & Veeraraghavan, 2009). However, the literature also contains a 
number of recent references to the legacy Wisconsin Benchmark (LeFevre et al., 2004; 
Wang et al., 2007; Zhu et al., 2008). Somewhat surprisingly, the Wisconsin Benchmark 
continues to be used in quantifying the performance aspects of fine-grained access 
control, in spite of the fact that it is does not adequately simulate a multi-user 
environment (Bitton, DeWitt, & Turbyfill, 1983). However, as noted by Elnikety et al. 
(2009), researchers frequently take advantage of readily available benchmarks like the 
TPC (or Wisconsin) benchmarks due to the ease of implementation and the 
generalizability of results. Figure 10 depicts a conceptual framework for benchmarking 
that encompasses three major components – a workload generator, the system under test 
(SUT), and a performance monitor (Menascé, 2002). The performance monitor depicted 
in Figure 10 is employed to measure the rate of arriving and completed requests 
processed by the SUT. According to Menascé, generated workloads may be classified 
according to two characteristics – type and intensity. In terms of generated database 
workloads, the classification of workload type refers to the nature of the database 
transaction – read, insert, update, or delete. In the database environment, workload 
intensity is typically expressed in terms of transactions per second (TPS). Kalibera and 
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Tuma (2006) discussed the effect of random fluctuations on benchmark results and 
identified four issues that may cause random fluctuations affecting benchmark 
performance: 
1. System/database start-up;  
2. Loading the benchmark into memory;  
3. Measuring benchmark performance; 
4. Caching in memory of benchmark intermediate results.  
Kalibera and Tuma indicated that statistical averaging could be applied to summarize the 
results of benchmark testing. However, to employ statistical averaging, each step in the 
benchmark experiment must be executed multiple times and results collected must be 
averaged for each discrete step in the benchmark experiment (Kalibera and Tuma).  
Figure 10. Conceptual Benchmarking Framework (adapted from Menascé, 2002, p. 84) 
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Kalibera, Bulej, and Tuma (2005) defined a statistic termed an “impact factor” 
that may affect benchmark results. According to Kalibera et al. (2005), it is not possible 
to define the initial state at the beginning of each benchmark experiment, thus subsequent 
benchmark runs are influenced to some degree by the presence of a random initial state. 
To address this problem, an impact factor may be calculated as “…the ratio of the 
standard deviation of samples from different benchmark runs compared to the standard 
deviation of samples from individual benchmark runs” (Kalibera et al., 2005, p. 855). 
According to Kalibera et al., an impact factor greater than one indicates a skewed 
benchmark result due to random perturbations affecting the initial state. 
Kalibera and Tuma (2006) discussed the potential impact of memory caching on 
compilation times for open source packages and the resultant random skewing of 
benchmark results based upon package compile times. Similar issues have been noted in 
database systems. Bitton et al. (1983) provided recommendations for running database 
benchmarks in order to avoid skewing effects introduced by memory caching, including: 
1. Table size should be five times greater than the physical size of the database 
buffer cache; 
2. Response times should be computed as the mean of repeated queries; 
3. Adjacent queries should be executed against separate tables to minimize the 
likelihood that the data requested resides in the database buffer cache; 
4. Performance statistics should be based upon elapsed times to minimize 
confounding variations imposed by hardware and operating systems. 
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TPC Benchmarks 
Research investigating the performance impacts of fine-grained access control 
frequently utilizes one of the TPC benchmarks for performance evaluations. A summary 
of three TPC benchmarks commonly used in quantifying fine-grained access control 
performance costs are provided in Table 1. The TPC benchmarks listed in Table 1 were 
developed to quantify the performance of specific workload types, specifically On-line 
Transaction Processing (OLTP), Decision Support Systems (DSS), and e-Commerce. The 
TPC-C (OLTP) benchmark was designed to measure performance characteristics 
associated with the insertion of new transactions (Transaction Processing Performance 
Council, 2010). According to Chakraborty, Majumdar, and Sural (2010), the TPC-C 
benchmark can be useful in security benchmarking as the transaction types and 
probability of occurrence are formally specified for the benchmark. The TPC-H (DSS) 
benchmark was designed to simulate ad hoc business queries against large, complex 
databases like data warehouses (Transaction Processing Performance Council). The TPC-
W benchmark, intended to simulate a business-to-consumer (B2C) Web site, was 
designed to be scalable using modest sized databases and a fixed ratio of read and write 
transactions (Menascé, 2002), According to  Menascé, the TPC-W benchmark “…tests 
many of the important elements of most e-commerce applications…” (p. 87). 
   Table 1. TPC Benchmarks (Transaction Performance Processing Council, 2003) 
Benchmark Type Application Emulation Initially Published 
TPC-C OLTP On-Line Warehouse July 1992 
TPC-H Decision Support Data Warehouse February 1999 
TPC-W Web e-Commerce On-line Store December 1999 
 
According to Keeton and Patterson (2000), it is not generally feasible for 
researchers to run full-scale database benchmarks. Full-scale benchmarks in the 
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commercial environment, like the TPC benchmarks, typically required servers and 
associated hardware costing millions of dollars and involving complex configuration and 
tuning challenges (Keeton & Patterson). Instead, researchers often adapt existing 
benchmarks like the TPC benchmarks to run on small-scale servers (Elnikety et al., 
2009). Alternatively, researcher may choose to use microbenchmarks, which are 
generally easier to implement and have modest hardware and software requirements 
(Keeton & Patterson). Microbenchmarks can also be used to investigate performance of 
isolated features of a system or application (Michiels, Manolescu, & Miachon, 2008). 
Vieira and Madeira (2005) proposed the use of a metric called “security 
requirement fulfillment” (SRF) as a method for estimating the overhead imposed by 
database security using a scale ranging from zero to 100. According to Vieira and 
Madeira, the SRF metric is a composite rating for the efficiency of multiple security 
mechanisms including authentication, authorization, fine-grained access control, and 
encryption. The SRF value proposed by Vieira and Madeira is calculated by measuring 
the elapsed time of execution for a series of predefined read and update statements 
executing against the TPC-W benchmark tables. The SRF was proposed as a conceptual 
model for quantifying database performance when the database is constrained by one or 
more security mechanisms. Vieira and Madeira did not provide any experimental data to 
validate the SRF model.  
Zhan et al. (2006) implemented an approach to fine-grained access control in the 
PostgreSQL 7.3 open source database. Performance of the approach chosen by Zhan et al. 
was evaluated using the TPC-C database benchmark. Results reported were based upon 
elapsed time of execution with a 90% confidence level. Zhan et al. reported 20-30% 
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degradation in performance using their novel fine-grained access control mechanism in 
the PostgreSQL 7.3 relational database management system. 
Kabra et al. (2006) evaluated the performance aspects of a novel approach to 
query simplification on a Microsoft SQL Server
®
 database using the TPC-H benchmark. 
Results reported were based upon elapsed time of execution. Kabra et al. reported that a 
10-15% performance penalty was associated with implementation of their query 
simplification mechanism. However, Kabra et al., also found that the overhead imposed 
by query simplification was offset by significant improvements in query throughput. 
According to Kabra et al., redundancy removal is a practical approach to improving the 
efficiency of fine-grained access control implemented using a view replacement model. 
Zhu and Lü (2007) described the use of security policies implemented as SQL 
statements to provide fine-grained access control in a relational database management 
system. The approach described by Zhu and Lü extends SQL capability in a manner that 
conceptually parallels the implementation of the Oracle
®
 VPD technology by using 
database stored procedures and constraints to filter query results returned to the user. The 
goal of the work described by Zhu and Lü was to define a flexible, efficient framework 
for administering authorizations. Zhu and Lü evaluated the performance of their model 
using the TPC-W database benchmark executed against the DM5 relational database 
management system. Zhu and Lü reported a 10-15% performance penalty using their 
novel approach to fine-grained access control.  
TPC-W Benchmark 
The TPC-W benchmark suite has been used extensively for performance and 
security benchmarking (Vieira & Madeira, 2005; Kabra et al., 2006; Zhu & Lü, 2007; 
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Elnikety et al., 2009). As well, the TPC-W benchmark is routinely employed as a 
capacity-planning tool for e-commerce Web sites (Mi, Casale, Cherkasova, & Smirni, 
2009). According to Menascé and Almeida (2001), the TPC-W benchmark is particularly 
useful in that it measures the performance of the whole system including CPU, network, 
I/O subsystem, operating system, and database. As well, source code for a number of 
TPC-W workload generators is freely available. For example, the University of 
Wisconsin distributes a Java-based TPC-W workload generator that is particularly useful 
to researchers (PHARM, n.d.). 
The TPC-W benchmark was introduced in December 1999 and was designed to 
emulate an on-line bookseller (Transaction Processing Performance Council, 2003). The 
TPC-W benchmark measures the throughput of database transactions generated by a 
series of emulated web browsers. The metric termed “Web Interactions per Second” 
(WIPS) is used to report results for the TPC-W benchmark. According to the Transaction 
Processing Performance Council, the size of the database containing the on-line store is 
scaled based upon the number of rows in the ITEM table, which can range in size from 
1,000 to 10,000,000 rows. The TPC-W benchmark is a popular choice for benchmark 
testing using small-scale systems given the simplicity of the benchmark structure and the 
small size of the base tables (Zhu & Lü, 2007; Elnikety et al., 2009; Mi et al., 2009).  
According to Menascé (2002), scalability in the TPC-W benchmark is maintained 
by adhering to a fixed ratio or “scale factor” between the number of Web clients, termed 
“Emulated Browser Sessions” or EBS, and the cardinality of the ITEM table. The 
Transaction Processing Performance Council (2003) specifies that a minimum of 2,880 
rows in the CUTOMER table must be configured for each EBS. Table 2 lists table 
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cardinalities for the TPC-W benchmark. According to the TPC-W benchmark guidelines 
published by the Transaction Processing Performance Council (2003), the cardinality of 
the ITEM table may range from 1,000 rows to 10,000,000 rows. The default cardinality 
for the ITEM table is 10,000 rows, which results in a database size of approximately 2.8 
GB. However, Keeton and Patterson (2000) recommended that tables used for 
Table 2. TPC-W Cardinalities (Transaction Performance Processing Council, 2003) 
Table Name Cardinality Row Length Table Size (MB) 
CUSTOMER 2880 * (number of EBS) 760 bytes 258 MB 
COUNTRY 92   70 bytes 0.006 MB 
ADDRESS 2 * CUSTOMER 154 bytes 866 MB 
ORDERS .9 * CUSTOMER 220 bytes 557 MB 
ORDER_LINE 3 * ORDERS 132 bytes 1002 MB 
AUTHOR .25 * ITEM 630 bytes 1.5 MB 
CC_XACTS 1 * ORDERS   80 bytes 202 MB 
ITEM 1K – 10M 860 bytes 8.3 MB 
 
benchmarking should be at least four times the size of the database buffer cache and 
Bitton et al. (1983) provided a similar recommendation, namely that tables should be 
sized approximately five times larger than the database buffer cache. According to both 
Keeton and Patterson, and Bitton et al., these recommendations should be followed to 
ensure that SQL benchmark queries generate disk I/O requests, rather than retrieving data 
already resident in the database buffer cache. Therefore, the number of rows in the TPC-
W ITEM table generally needs to be set higher than the default value of 10,000 rows in 
order to avoid the skewing effect sometimes evident when benchmark data is retrieved 
partially from the database buffer cache and partially from slower disk storage.  
Elnikety et al. (2009) described the composition of the workload mixes in the TPC-W 
benchmark as follows: 
 Browsing mix – 5% update transactions, 95% read-only transactions; 
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 Shopping mix – 20% update transactions, 80% read-only transactions; 
 Ordering mix – 50% update transactions, 50% read-only transactions.  
According to Elnikety et al., the shopping mix is the primary benchmark workload. The 
experimental design employed by Elnikety et al. demonstrated that the TPC-W workload 
mix scales linearly on small-scale database servers, due in part to the preponderance of 
read-only transactions in the combined workload mixes. Figure 11 depicts the logical 
 
Figure 11. TPC-W Logical Data Model (adapted from Menascé, 2002, p. 85) 
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data model for the eight tables that comprise the database component of the TPC-W 
benchmark. The cardinality of ADDRESS, ODERS, ORDER_LINE, and CC_XACT are 
determined as a fixed ratio to the cardinality of the CUSTOMER table. The COUNTRY 
table contains a fixed number of rows; the AUTHOR table must be populated as fixed 
multiple (25%) of the size of the ITEM table (Transaction Processing Performance 
Council, 2003). 
 
Performance Models 
 
Jain (1991) stated that, “Queuing theory is the key analytical modeling technique 
used for computer systems performance analysis” (p. 505). According to Jain, simple 
systems, such as those defined in the TPC-W benchmark specification, can be 
represented using a network of several queues. Thus, queuing theory provides the 
theoretical foundation underlying benchmarks such as the TPC-W benchmark. 
Queuing network models or systems are classified as open, mixed, or closed. In a 
closed queuing system, arrival of new jobs is constrained by the number of jobs currently 
being executed, whereas in an open system, arrival of new jobs is independent of the 
number of executing jobs (Schroeder, Wierman, & Harchol-Balter (2006). A mixed 
queuing network model combines elements of both open and closed system models. 
However, Schroeder et al. cautioned that open and closed systems could produce 
significantly different results using the identical benchmark executing against the same 
database. Thus, it is attendant upon researchers to both understand, and clearly describe 
the queuing model being employed when reporting experimental results derived from 
benchmarking. 
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The TPC-W database benchmark conforms to the closed network queuing model 
(Schroeder et al., 2006). According to Schroeder et al. (2006), the TPC-W benchmark 
specifies that a fixed number of database connections must be reserved for each Web 
client. Under the closed network queuing model, new connection requests are queued if 
free database connections are not available.  
Elnikety et al. (2009) described an approach for predicting database workload 
scalability using a closed queuing network model. The model proposed by Elnikety et al. 
utilized data collected from the TPC-W benchmark. According to Menascé (2002), the 
TPC-W benchmark is well suited for this task as it can be used to measure both 
throughput and scalability. Zhu et al. (2006) and Zhu and Lü (2007) effectively employed 
the TPC-W benchmark to evaluate the performance impacts of fine-grained access 
control implementations in relational database management systems by evaluating 
changes in throughput and scalability in the presence of fine-grained access control. 
Jin, Tan, Han, and Liu (2007) cautioned that the use of performance models such 
as queuing models and Marchov chain models are best suited for estimating the 
performance of new systems under design, and are potentially unsuited for modeling 
systems already in production. Specifically, Jin et al. (2007) stated that extrapolating 
performance of legacy relational database management systems, where database activity 
is projected to increase substantially, requires detailed knowledge of the application and 
the operating environment. According to Jin et al., “To make use of them [analytical 
models], one needs to understand and quantify the system’s actual performance 
characteristics and operating environment” (p. 540). 
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The Contribution This Study Will Make to the Field 
There is relatively little data in the literature quantifying the performance of 
database fine-grained access control (Zhang, 2008). Yet, in terms of real-world 
applications, there is a genuine and increasing need for the use of database fine-grained 
access control, particularly for Web-based applications (Zhu et al., 2008). This study was 
undertaken to address the question “Which approach to providing database fine-grained 
access control offers better performance?” As well, the study also examined the issue of 
scalability for database fine-grained access control. Four fine-grained access control 
mechanisms for relational database systems were evaluated using security benchmarking 
– authorization views, transparent query rewrite, a Hippocratic Database, and label-based 
access control. Using metrics derived from security benchmarking, a generic model was 
developed. The model can be used to understand the performance and scalability impacts 
of the four selected fine-grained access control mechanisms. The model provides a 
research-based tool that should help to dispel concerns about the performance and 
scalability of fine-grained access control for relational database management systems.  
 
Summary 
Roichman and Gudes (2007) and Zhu and Lü (2007) identified the integration of 
database systems with Internet technology as driving the requirement for database fine-
grained access control in order to ensure suitable data security. Johnson and Grandison 
(2007) identified fine-grained access as a suitable mechanism to address legislated 
requirements for data privacy and to cope with the complexities of cross-jurisdictional 
data privacy requirements. Yet, a standard approach to implementing fine-grained access 
  
76 
control for relational database management systems remains elusive. Wang et al. (2007) 
cited the technical difficulties as the most critical factor limiting the widespread 
deployment of fine-grained access control in relational database management systems. 
Further, Bertino and Sandhu (2005) noted that all of the current approaches to 
implementing fine-grained access control in relational database management systems are 
problematic, and new solutions are potentially required. Specifically, Bertino and Sandhu 
noted that most of the current approaches to fine-grained access control based upon view 
replacement and thus can return incorrect results or exhibit decidability problems. 
Nevertheless, commercial database products that support fine-grained access 
control are available from IBM
®
, Oracle
®
, Sybase
®
 and Microsoft
®
 (Kabra et al., 2006; 
Zhang, 2008). In addition, generic approaches to database fine-grained access control 
such as Hippocratic Databases and authorization views offer feasible and pragmatic 
alternatives to commercial products (Bertino et al., 2005). Agrawal et al. (2005) 
identified simplicity and ease of maintenance as two of the most important factors in 
selecting a fine-grained access control technology for relational database management 
systems. However, performance is also an important criterion in selecting an appropriate 
fine-grained access control mechanism, although performance is often treated as a 
secondary consideration (Kabra et al., 2006).  
The approach to database fine-grained access control described by Abramov et al. 
(2012) reflects a trend evident in recent research related to the use of fine-grained access 
control. Recent research in this area tends to focus upon the use of access control policies 
as a general mechanism for specification of fine-grained security, in both software 
systems and relational database management systems, without particular concern for the 
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efficiency of the mechanism. This trend towards generalization of fine-grained access 
control can be seen, for example, in the works of Krishnamurthy et al. (2010), Moore 
(2011), Abramov et al. (2012), and Wang et al. (2012). 
At present, there are no known references in the literature describing comparative 
performance data for database fine-grained access control. In practice, security 
benchmarking can be employed for individual implementations of database fine-grained 
access control to provide comparative performance data for queries both with and without 
fine-grained access control. However, benchmarking is a complex and time-consuming 
process and may require expert knowledge for correct interpretation (Keeton & Paterson, 
2000; Gunther, 2004). Analytical models, based upon data collected from benchmarking, 
provide a means to predict database performance and scalability using small-scale servers 
readily available to researchers and software developers. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
 
 
Approach 
The purpose of the author’s study was to quantify the relationship between the use 
of database fine-grained access control and the resultant performance impact on database 
transaction throughput. Experiment is a research methodology employed to investigate 
causal relationships using controlled tests (Dawson, 2000). The cause-and-effect 
relationship between fine-grained access control and database performance was 
demonstrated through experiments conducted in the laboratory. Sekaran (2003) suggested 
that cause-and-effect relationships are best established through laboratory experiments. 
The study conducted confirmed a statistically significant cause-and-effect relationship 
between degradation in query performance and the use of fine-grained access control in a 
relational database management system.  
Benchmarking was employed as the primary tool to quantify database 
performance at the transactional level. Benchmarking provides a means to measure 
efficiencies while simultaneously executing workloads representative of real-world 
conditions (Santos & Bernardino, 2009). While primarily viewed as a tool for comparing 
the relative performance of different server hardware, benchmarking is also an effective 
  
79 
tool for comparing the performance of similar or competing software products (Gray, 
1992). Moreover, benchmarking provides a practical approach to compare database 
security mechanisms between different database products (Vieira & Madeira, 2005). 
The goal of the author’s study was to develop and validate a generic performance 
model for Fine-grained Access Control Evaluation (FACE). The FACE model is 
considered generic in the sense that it is not restricted to any specific database product or 
server architecture (Melnik et al., 2003). The FACE model provides a high-level, 
architecture independent viewpoint that quantifies the performance costs and scalability 
of database fine-grained access control. Metrics underlying the FACE model were 
derived from security performance benchmarking. 
Benchmarking as an approach to quantifying performance costs of database fine-
grained access control has been described in the literature in considerable detail by 
LeFevre et al., 2004,  Kabra et al., 2006, Wang et al., 2007, Zhu et al., 2008, and Shi et 
al., (2009). Using the Wisconsin Benchmark and tables of one million, five million, 10 
million, and 15 million rows, LeFevre et al. quantified query performance based upon 
elapsed time of execution for queries both with and without fine-grained access control. 
Kabra et al. evaluated the performance of selected TPC-H benchmark queries; those 
queries were re-written to remove redundancies introduced by the addition of fine-
grained access control predicates. Kabra et al. quantified the performance of modified 
and unmodified TPC-H queries by measuring query execution time. Wang et al. 
implemented a fine-grained access control scheme using SQL CASE statements against 
tables from the Wisconsin benchmark; performance was quantified by measuring query 
execution time for modified and unmodified queries against a table containing one 
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hundred thousand rows. Zhu et al. employed SQL CASE statements and the SQL 
MINUS operator to modify SQL queries in order to mask data and to implement security 
polices termed “enforcing rules”. Zhu et al. quantified the performance of unmodified 
queries, row-level access control enforcement, and cell-level enforcement through 
comparing the respective query execution times against a table in the Wisconsin 
benchmark containing one hundred thousand rows. In an approach conceptually similar 
to Zhu et al., Shi et al. used a combination of authorization views, SQL CASE statements, 
nullification, and the SQL MINUS operator to enforce row and cell-level access control. 
Shi et al. quantified query performance using elapsed time of execution against a table 
containing one hundred thousand rows derived from the Wisconsin benchmark.  
According to DeWitt (1992) in his seminal paper describing the history of the 
Wisconsin Benchmark, the elapsed time of execution is the best metric for measuring 
database transactional throughput. Dewitt also asserted that elapsed time of execution can 
be measured consistently between databases of different architectures, using disparate 
server hardware, and different operating systems. Modern database benchmarks continue 
to be based upon this approach to benchmarking. The FACE model quantifies the 
performance and scalability of four commonly employed fine-grained access control 
mechanisms – authorization views, the Hippocratic database, LBAC, and transparent 
query rewrite. The FACE model was derived using the following approach: 
 Evaluation of multiple fine-grained access control mechanisms using the same 
controlled hardware and software environment; 
 Evaluation of multiple fine-grained access control mechanisms using both 
synthetic and real-world data; 
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 Evaluation of fine-grained access control mechanisms using complex 
transactions based upon queries that differ by an order of magnitude in 
complexity (as determined by query cost analysis). 
The FACE model provides a simple visual model to represent the performance of 
multiple fine-grained access control mechanisms evaluated in the same controlled 
database environment. The objective in formulating the FACE model was to provide an 
answer to the question “Which fine-grained access control mechanism offers the better 
performance and scalability?” In many cases, database professionals and system 
architects have limited control or influence over the specific database technology used 
when developing a new application (Rosenthal, Sciore, and Doshi, 1999). However, they 
often do have a significant degree of control over database security decisions, including 
whether or not to implement database fine-grained access control. 
 
Data 
 
Two data sets were utilized in the derivation of the FACE model. One of the data 
sets contained synthetic data as defined by the Transaction Processing Performance 
Council (2003) for the TPC-W benchmark. The other data set contained real-world data 
extracted from a large wildlife habitat capability and suitability model. Each data set was 
evaluated independently, both with and without the use of database fine-grained access 
control. 
The TPC-W benchmark data was used as the basis for formulating the FACE 
model. Elnikety et al. (2009) demonstrated that the TPC-W benchmark is particularly 
well suited for use in evaluating database performance and scalability on small-scale 
database servers. As well, Mi et al. (2009) described the TPC-W as a credible benchmark 
  
82 
that is routinely used for evaluating both middle-tier and database performance. It should 
be noted however that the TPC-W benchmark was declared obsolete as a commercial 
benchmark as of April 28, 2005 (Transaction Processing Performance Council, n.d.). 
Nevertheless, the TPC-W benchmark continues to be widely used in academic research. 
The literature contains numerous references to the TPC-W benchmark methodology as 
well as a significant number of references citing database performance metrics derived 
from benchmarking using the TPC-W benchmark (Mi et al., 2009). 
The wildlife habitat capability and suitability data set was used to validate the 
FACE model using a series of custom benchmark queries; a sample of these queries is 
provided in Appendix F. Database performance and scalability were evaluated using this 
data set both with and without fine-grained access control. A Web application was 
developed in 2002 to access the wildlife habitat capability and suitability data as part of a 
project to make summary wildlife capability and suitability data accessible to the public. 
The Web application included a number of complex SQL queries that incorporated joins 
over the two largest tables – the capability table and the suitability table. The SQL code 
for these complex queries was extracted from the application code and was adapted to 
provide representative benchmarks. Given the processing intensive nature of these 
queries, they were considered good candidates for use in evaluating the performance 
overhead imposed by fine-grained access control.  
The wildlife habitat capability and suitability data set contains two large tables, 
each containing 32 million rows, and a small number of related support tables. A logical 
data model for the wildlife habitat capability and suitability application data is provided 
in Figure 12. In March 2009, the wildlife habitat capability and suitability Web 
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application was taken offline. The application was infrequently used and no further 
funding was available for application maintenance. Thus, the Web application is no 
longer available to the public. 
 
Figure 12. Habitat Capability-Suitability Logical Data Model 
  
The TPC-W database tables, and the wildlife habitat capability and suitability 
database tables were modified to add three additional columns that were used as the basis 
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of privacy enforcement in a Hippocratic Database configuration following the approach 
described by LeFevre et al. (2004). As well, a column containing a security label was 
added to each table to support evaluation of fine-grained access control mechanisms 
using authorization views, transparent query rewrite, and LBAC. Similar modifications 
were made to the structure of the TPC-W benchmark tables. LeFevre et al. evaluated the 
impact of modifying database tables to include privacy enforcement data and concluded 
that the impact on performance was minimal when the number of stored choices is kept 
to a minimum.  
 
Experimental Design 
The FACE model provides a simple means to quantify the performance costs of 
fine-grained access control. Past research has identified a number of variables that have 
the potential to constrain the performance of relational database management systems 
(DeWitt, 1992; Keeton & Patterson, 2000; LeFevre et al., 2004; Avritzerv& Weyuker, 
2004; Kabra et al., 2006; Chaudhuri, 2009; Zhang et al., 2009).  In the author’s study, the 
effect on database performance of three variables was measured through experimentation 
for the TPC-W data set. The three variables are described in Table 3. However, only the 
first two variables, fine-grained access control and query complexity were evaluated for 
the wildlife data set. The wildlife application, from which sample SELECT benchmark 
queries were extracted, contained no SQL INSERT or UPDATE statements.  
Table 3. Experiment Variables and Levels 
Symbol Variable Level -1 Level +1 
A Fine-grained Access Control Not Enabled Enabled 
B Query Complexity Simple Complex 
C SQL Operation Select Update 
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The procedure for measuring experimental effects was as follows: 
1. Independent Variable 
 The experimental design evaluated the effect of fine-grained access control on 
database performance;  
 The independent variable was evaluated at two levels – not enabled (-1), and 
enabled (+1). 
2. Dependent Variables 
 The experimental design evaluated the effect of two dependent variables, 
query complexity, and SQL operation, on the independent variable; 
 Each dependent variable had two levels, represented by (-1) and (+1); 
 Query complexity was estimated based upon cost analysis – simple queries 
were assigned a value of -1 and complex queries were assigned a value of +1;  
 Two SQL operations were evaluated – SELECT operations were assigned a 
value of -1 and UPDATE operations were assigned a value of +1. 
Zhu and Lü (2007) evaluated their fine-grained access control model using a 
subset of the TPC-W benchmark. Specifically, Zhu and Lü employed queries against the 
ORDER and ORDER_LINE tables to evaluate performance under load. In the 
experimental design employed by the author, a subset of the TPC-W benchmark, 
consisting of two SELECT queries and two UPDATE queries was used to quantify 
performance.  
Table 4 lists the queries employed in the evaluation. Representative queries were 
selected based on estimated query cost and the desire to avoid table access conflicts. 
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Table 4. Measures of complexity for selected TPC-W queries 
Query Name Estimated Cost SQL Operation Query Complexity 
getName 16.62 SELECT Simple 
getBook 33.23 SELECT Complex 
resetCartTime 6.65 UPDATE Simple 
refreshCartUpdate 33.30 UPDATE Complex 
 
Both LeFevre et al. (2004) and Kabra et al. (2006) warned that implementation of 
fine-grained access control in relational database management systems typically results in 
increased complexity of SQL queries. Kabra et al. and Chaudhuri (2009) documented that 
increased complexity of SQL queries leads to increased query optimization times and 
longer elapsed times for query execution. Thus, given the known relationship between 
query complexity and query performance, a metric representing query complexity was 
one of the independent variables employed in the author’s experimental design. 
Most of the current literature describes the performance implications of fine-
grained access control only as they relate to read-only transactions. Wang et al. (2007) 
stated that fine-grained authorizations are more likely to be applied to read-only (i.e., 
SQL SELECT) operations than to update or delete operations. Kocatürk and Gündem 
(2008) justified a focus on read-only operations on the basis that the majority of users 
accessing database tables are limited to read-only access. In addition, Corcoran et al. 
(2009) observed that update operations that occur simultaneously with the execution of 
read-only queries could inhibit effective query optimization. Zhang et al. (2009) noted 
that in a mixed transaction environment (i.e., including both read and insert/delete 
operations); periodic resampling of table cardinality is suggested if effective query 
optimization is to be achieved. To address the issues raised by Kocatürk and Gündem, 
and Corcoran et al., the experimental design employed by the author evaluated read and 
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update operations separately. To address the query optimization issue raised by Zhang et 
al., table cardinality remained fixed throughout the benchmarking process. 
A 2
k
 factorial design can be used to measure the effect of k variables, where each 
variable has two levels (Jain, 1991). A 2
k
r factorial design extends the 2
k
 factorial design 
by including r replications of each experiment to allow experimental error to be 
calculated. A 2
k
r factorial design was used to structure the experiments conducted by the 
author. Table 3 describes the variables that were measured in the experiments – each 
variable was evaluated at two levels. According to Jain, “The variation due to a factor 
[variable] must be compared with that due to errors before making a decision about its 
effect” (p. 278). 
 
Specific Procedures Employed 
The author evaluated four different implementation models of database fine-grained 
access control against three different databases, containing an ITEM table with one 
hundred thousand, one million, and 10 million rows respectively. According to Menascé 
(2002), scalability in the TPC-W benchmark can be established by varying the cardinality 
of the ITEM table. The implementation models evaluated by the author included: 
1. Simple parameterized authorization views based on user-id as described by Rizvi 
et al. (2004) and as shown in the SQL code listing in Appendix A; 
2. A prototype Hippocratic Database based upon the methodology described by 
LeFevre et al. (2004) and as shown in the SQL code listing in Appendix B; 
3. An implementation of LBAC similar to the approach described by Rask et al. 
(2005) for SQL Server
®
 and as shown in the SQL code listing in Appendix C; 
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4. An implementation of transparent query rewrite conceptually similar to Oracle® 
VPD. Transparent query rewrite was implemented under PostgreSQL using views 
and a database stored procedure to fetch the user security context from memory. 
SQL code for the views is provided in Appendix D. 
While the implementation models chosen for evaluation do not embody an 
exhaustive list of fine-grained access control mechanisms, they are considered 
representative of past research in the field (Zhang, 2008). In addition, the implementation 
models that were chosen all have a well-documented theoretical foundation (Bertino et 
al., 2005). Each of the chosen implementations of fine-grained access control was 
evaluated using the PostgreSQL open source database. PostgreSQL is a popular open 
source relational database management system that runs on multiple platforms including 
Windows, Linux, and UNIX. PostgreSQL is the successor to the INGRES
®
 database 
system, first used to demonstrate fine-grained access control through query rewriting 
(Stonebraker & Rowe, 1986).  
The experimental set-up as depicted in Figure 13 consisted of a workload 
generator and a dedicated database server. The workload generator and database server 
were interconnected using a dedicated Gigabit network isolated from Internet traffic. 
Query performance was measured based upon the elapsed time to completion for each 
transaction. The author’s experimental set-up was similar to experimental hardware and 
software configurations described by Zhu et al. (2006), Elnikety et al. (2009), and Mi et 
al. (2009). 
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Figure 13. Physical Framework for Benchmarking 
 
 
Generalizability was an important consideration in developing the FACE model. 
The model must be theoretically sound but must also be relevant in providing a basis to 
extrapolate the performance and scalability of real-world database implementations. 
According to Sekaran (2003), experimental results that can be verified through field-
testing are useful in establishing generalizability. Employing an open source database and 
the TPC-W benchmark in the development of the FACE model was intended to ensure 
that the model is generalizable and that other researchers can verify published results. 
Table 5. Benchmark Test Bed Environment 
Resource Client  Database Server 
OS Windows 2008 R2  CentOS 5.6 
Application Jmeter  PostgreSQL 9.0.4 
CPU 2 X 2.8 GHz AMD  1 X 2.13 GHz AMD 
Memory 8 GB RAM  2 GB RAM 
Disk 320 GB SATA  80 GB IDE/160 GB SATA 
Network 1 Gbit  1 Gbit 
 
Table 5 provides a summary of the hardware and software environment that 
comprised the benchmark test bed employed in the experimentation portion of the 
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author’s study. The Apache Jmeter open source test tool was used to manage the TPC-W 
queries and to record query execution times. According to the Apache Software 
Foundation (n.d.), the Jmeter tool provides the capability to simulate multiple user access 
by allowing multiple concurrent threads of execution to be managed through Jmeter. 
Keeton and Patterson (2000) noted that simulation using small-scale processors is 
a pragmatic approach to modeling performance of large-scale systems. According to 
Keeton and Patterson, large-scale systems may be comprised of multiple large 
processors, many gigabytes of physical memory, and hundreds of disk storage devices. 
Thus, only researchers with commercial ties are likely to undertake performance 
evaluations using large-scale systems (Keeton & Patterson).  
 
 
Figure 14. TPC-W Benchmark Scalability on a Small-Scale Processor 
 
Menascé (2002) described the TPC-W benchmark as a scalable benchmark. 
Scalability in the TPC-W benchmark may be demonstrated by varying either the 
cardinality of the ITEM table, the number of EBS’s, or both (Menascé). Figure 14 depicts 
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TPC-W benchmark results obtained by the author using the getBestSellers query 
evaluated against the ITEM table containing one hundred thousand, one million, and 10 
million rows respectively. As well, the number of EBSs was incremented from three 
hundred to 6000. Figure 14 depicts classical canonical throughput characteristics 
(throughput versus load) for each of the three respective workloads (Gunther, 2004).  
Phase 1 – Baseline Performance Evaluation using the TPC-W Benchmark  
In the first phase of the author’s experimentation, the test bed environment was 
configured and baseline results were collected. Specific procedures undertaken included:  
1. Configuring the servers and database software; 
2. Populating three shared PostgreSQL databases with the TPC-W benchmark data; 
Modifying the TPC-W base tables to include additional columns to be used in 
the implementation of fine-grained access control; 
3. Creating four additional database schemas per database, one for each 
implementation of fine-grained access control to be evaluated; access control 
mechanisms implemented within these schemas utilized data from the common 
(public) database schema through the use of views;  
4. Configuring the Jmeter test tool to launch and monitor TPC-W workloads; 
5. Executing three trials of each TPC-W workload without fine-grained access 
control (i.e., the null case) to validate the test bed configuration. The database 
was restarted before each trial to flush both the database and operating system 
buffer caches. According to Smith (2007), the PostgreSQL database has a limited 
internal buffer cache and thus relies heavily upon the much larger operating 
system file cache as an extension to the internal database buffer cache. 
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Phase 2 – Performance Evaluation using the TPC-W Benchmark 
In the second phase of the author’s experimental work, three experiments were 
conducted to evaluate the performance of the selected fine-grained access control 
mechanisms against three separate databases, scaled against one hundred thousand items, 
one million items, and 10 million items respectively. Within each of the three 
experiments, five separate workloads were evaluated, ranging from 800 to 4000 EBS’s. 
Each experiment employed a 2
k
r factorial design using the TPC-W benchmark data to 
evaluate performance. Specific procedures undertaken included: 
1. Three repetitions for each of the five TPC-W workloads executed against the 
authorization view schema; 
2. Three repetitions for each of the five TPC-W workloads executed against the 
Hippocratic Database schema; 
3. Three repetitions for each of the five TPC-W workloads against the LBAC 
schema; 
4. Three repetitions for each of the five TPC-W workloads executed against the 
transparent query rewrite schema.  
Phase 3 – Performance Evaluation of a Real-World Data Set 
In the third phase of the author’s experimental work, one additional experiment 
was conducted to evaluate the performance of the selected fine-grained access control 
mechanisms against the wildlife data set, which resided in a separate PostgreSQL 
database. Five separate workloads were evaluated, ranging from 800 to 4000 EBS’s. The 
experiment employed a 2
k
r factorial design using wildlife capability and suitability data 
to evaluate performance. Specific procedures undertaken included: 
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1. Populating a PostgreSQL databases with wildlife capability and suitability data;  
2. Modifying the capability and suitability base tables to include additional columns 
to be used in the implementation of fine-grained access control; 
3. Creating four additional database schemas, one for each implementation of fine-
grained access control that was evaluated; access control mechanisms 
implemented within separate schemas accessed data from a shared schema;  
4. Identifying SQL queries to be employed as workloads for evaluating each type of 
fine-grained access control against the wildlife data; the queries were derived 
from the legacy Web application used by the public to query wildlife data; 
5. Configuring the Jmeter test tool to launch and monitor wildlife workloads; 
6. Three repetitions for each of the five wildlife workloads executed against the 
shared schema containing the wildlife data base tables; 
7. Three repetitions for each of the five wildlife workloads executed against the 
authorization view schema; 
8. Three repetitions for each of the five wildlife workloads executed against the 
Hippocratic database schema; 
9. Three repetitions for each of the five wildlife workloads executed against the 
LBAC schema; 
10. Three repetitions for each of the five wildlife workloads executed against the 
transparent query rewrite schema.  
 
Formats for Presenting Results 
The results for each of the author’s experiments are presented using sign tables. 
Table 6 provides an example of a sign table for a 2
k
r experimental design employing 
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three repetitions (i.e., r=3). Jain (1991) describes the elements of a sign table for a 2
k
r 
experimental design with three replications as follows: 
 the columns A, B, and C represent variables in the experiment (i.e., k=3); 
 each variable has two levels, indicated by the values 1 or -1; 
 columns AB, AC, BC, and ABC represent the interaction between variables;   
 data collected for each repetition is recorded in the columns y1, y2,y3;  
 the column Mean ӯ is the mean value of  y1, y2,y3 for the respective  row; 
 the product of the column values for a row and the mean value for the row 
(i.e., Mean ӯ) and are summed to derive the value “Total”; 
 columns labeled “Total/8” contains the column totals divided by the number 
of rows in the table; these values are represented by q0, qA, qB,…qABC.  
Table 6. Sign Table for a 2
3
3 Experimental Design (Adapted from Jain, 1991). 
 
 
According to Jain (1991), the results from a sign table for a 2
3
r experimental 
design with three repetitions (r=3) can be analyzed using the following calculations: 
Equation 1.1  SSY = x1
2
 + y2
2
 + y3
2…+yx
2 
(Sum of squares of the observations) 
Equation 1.2  SS0 = 2
k
rq0
2     
(Sum of squares of the mean) 
Equation 1.3  SST = SSY – SS0   (Sum of squares total) 
The variables and their interactions in a 2
3
3 experimental design are represented by A, B, 
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C, AB, AC, BC, and ABC. The respective sums of squares are SSA, SSB, SSC, SSAB, 
SSAC, SSBC, and SSABC. The sum of squares for variable A is calculated as: 
Equation 1.4   SSA = 2
k
rqA
2
   (Sum of squares for A)
 
The percentage of variation attributed to variable A is calculated as: 
Equation 1.5   SSA / SST * 100%  (Percentage of variation due to A)
 
The sum of squares errors (SSE) can be calculated as:
 
Equation 1.6  SSE = SSY – 23r(q0
2
+qA
2
+qB
2
+qC
2
+q
2
AB+q
2
AC+q
2
BC+q
2
ABC) 
Equation 1.7  df = 2
3
(r-1)   (degrees of freedom for SSE) 
Equation 1.8  
)1(23 

r
SSE
se   (standard deviation of errors) 
Equation 1.9  
r
se
sqi
32
    (standard deviation of effects) 
Using the standard deviation of effects (sqi = 0.51) from Equation 1.9 (based upon the 
sample data in Table 6) and the t-value from a standard t-table for 16 degrees of freedom 
and 90% confidence (i.e., t(.10,16)=1.337), confidence intervals may be calculated as:  
Equation 1.10 337.1*51.0iq   (confidence intervals for qi) 
The value qi represents the confidence intervals for the effects as measured for a specific 
sign table. Using qi the confidence interval for the interaction between each of the 
experimental variables, A, B, C, AB, AC, BC, and ABC can be determined. For example, 
using the sample data in Table 6, the confidence intervals for qA = (7.94, 9.31). 
The most effective and recognized method to represent performance data is 
through derivation of a single numeric value or metric. Dewitt (1992) cautioned that 
performance data collected as part of academic research may be largely ignored unless it 
can be represented simply. The FACE model is presented as a simple series of line graphs 
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to allow easy interpretation. The novel aspect of the FACE model is that four different 
implementations of fine-grained access control are presented in the same graph based 
upon comparable measurements from a common test bed platform. Elnikety et al. (2009) 
used line graphs to depict performance and scalability separately – performance was 
depicted as a measure of transaction throughput and scalability was as a measure of 
transaction response time. The FACE model employs separate line graphs to depict 
performance and scalability following the methodology of Elnikety et al. 
 
Resource Requirements 
The resources required to conduct the author’s study were modest. A single small-
scale server was dedicated to hosting a PostgreSQL database. All of the application 
software required, CentOS Linux, the PostgreSQL database, and the Apache Jmeter test 
tool are freely available as open source software to any researcher. Response time metrics 
were collected using the Jmeter open source tool from the Apache Software Foundation. 
Experimental data was analyzed in Microsoft Excel following the sign table methodology 
for calculating multi-variable effects as described by Jain (1991). The TPC-W benchmark 
data was generated using the PHARM (n.d.) distribution from the University of 
Wisconsin. The British Columbia Ministry of Environment provided the real-world 
wildlife habitat capability and suitability data used in this project. While the wildlife 
habitat capability and suitability data are in the public domain, only response times for 
queries against the wildlife habitat capability and suitability data are presented for use in 
validating the FACE model. The wildlife habitat capability and suitability data was 
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formerly deployed in a publically accessible Web-based application that did not include 
any read-write transactions. 
 
Reliability and Validity 
According to Salkind (2006), reliability indicates the consistency, stability, and 
predictability of the measurements in an experiment. Sekaran (2003) describes two forms 
of validity of concern to experimental design – internal validity and external validity. 
According to Sekaran, internal validity is the degree of authenticity in a cause-and-effect 
relationship whereas external validity constitutes the degree to which results can be 
generalized to real-world situations. 
In the experiments conducted, reliability was addressed through the use of 
commodity hardware and open source software, thereby allowing the experimental set-up 
to be replicated by other researchers. The experimental set-up employed methodologies 
similar to those described by Keeton and Patterson (2000),  LeFevre et al., (2004), Zhu 
and Lü (2007), and Elnikety et al., (2009) for measuring database performance on small-
scale servers. Stability of measured results was addressed by employing the TPC-W 
benchmark, which embodies well-known workload characteristics (Menascé & Almeida, 
2001). Predictability of the measurements in the experiments conducted was addressed 
using an experimental design that included replication, thus allowing the calculation of 
experimental error (Jain, 1991). 
Internal validity in laboratory experiments describes the confidence with which a 
researcher may state that the independent variable A causes changes in the dependent 
variables B, and C (Sekaran, 2003). Validity in this context refers to the degree to which 
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the experimental measurements establish or refute relationships between variables 
(Salkind, 2006). A 2
k
r experimental design was chosen for the experiments conducted in 
order to allow the calculation of experimental error. Thus, results reported can be show to 
be statistically significant with a reasonably high degree of validity.  
External validity for the experimental work conducted was established by 
evaluating the FACE model against a real-world data set. According to Sekaran (2003), 
cause-and-effect relationships established in the laboratory should be evaluated in a field 
setting to establish external validity. However as noted by Keeton and Patterson (2000), 
availability of large-scale systems for field-testing is not feasible for most research 
projects. Instead, a natural model constructed using components of a real-world system 
provides a practical alternative to artificial models like the TPC-W benchmark (Menascé 
& Almeida, 2001). The wildlife habitat capability-suitability is viewed by the author as a 
good candidate for use in establishing the generalizability of the FACE model as it 
constitutes a natural model that is both simple and relatively compact. 
 
Summary  
The demand for secure Web-based computing provides the motivation for wider 
adoption of fine-grained access control (Zhu and Lü, 2007). The contribution of the 
author’s study is a generic model, termed the FACE model. The FACE model quantifies 
the performance overhead of four common implementations of fine-grained access 
control.  
The goal in undertaking the author’s study was to extend and consolidate work on 
the performance aspects of fine-grained access control previously reported in the 
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literature. According to Kabra et al. (2006), understanding the performance implications 
of fine-grained access control is essential to use of the technology. The author employed 
experiment as the methodology for the study. Sharp and Howard (as cited in Dawson, 
2000) describe the nature of this work as applied research. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
 
 
Analysis 
 
In the author’s study, four experiments were conducted following the 
methodology described in Chapter 3. The first three experiments consisted of 150 trials, 
each with three repetitions. The first 75 trials evaluated a control and four different fine-
grained access control mechanisms using read-only queries based upon the TPC-W 
benchmark. The second 75 trials evaluated update transactions from the TPC-W 
benchmark. The fourth experiment consisted of 25 trials, each with three repetitions, 
employing a control and four different fine-grained access control mechanisms. In the 
fourth experiment, read-only queries against a large, real-world data set were evaluated. 
The queries employed for benchmarking in the fourth experiment were obtained from an 
online wildlife habitat capability/suitability application. The wildlife application, now 
defunct, did not contain any INSERT or UPDATE transactions.  
 
Validating the Experimental Configuration 
Zhu and Lü (2007) indicated that a TPC-W workload generated by four thousand 
EBS’s could be sustained on a small-scale server. To verify server capacity of the 
author’s experimental configuration, a complex TPC-W query was run against a 
dedicated server hosting a PostgreSQL database populated with 10 million rows in the 
ITEM table. Workload was managed using Jmeter to emulate 4000 EBS’s, which was the 
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largest TPC-W workload expected to be employed in the author’s study. Server 
performance data was collected using the Linux system activity reporter (SAR) utility. 
The SAR utility captures four statistics – percentage of time waiting on system processes 
(System), percentage of time waiting on user processes (User), percentage of time 
waiting on disk devices (Wait), and percentage of time the CPU is idle (Idle). As depicted 
in Figure 15, CPU time expended executing System (green) and User (red) processes 
never exceeded 60% while executing the test query, demonstrating that the small-scale 
server employed by the author provided sufficient capacity for the TPC-W workloads to 
be evaluated in the study.  
 
Figure 15. Server Load while Executing a TPC-W Workload with 4000 EBS 
 
Bitton et al. (1983), and Keeton and Patterson (2000)  observed that when 
benchmarking SQL queries, best results are obtained  when the SQL queries generate 
disk access requests rather than retrieving data already resident in the database buffer 
cache. Server activity statistics depicted in Figure 15 illustrates that the greatest 
proportion of server activity during execution of the author’s test query was spent waiting 
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for data to be read from disk. This test confirmed that for an ITEM table containing 10 
million rows, the TPC-W query evaluated was not able to satisfy the query using data 
residing in the buffer cache and was therefore required to fetch data from disk. 
Kalibera and Tuma (2006) indicated that fluctuations caused by data caching 
could distort benchmark performance measures. In order to minimize the influences of 
data caching on benchmark results, the database buffers and the operating system file 
cache were flushed prior to running each repetition of the author’s experiments. 
Figure 16 depicts the results when the same TPC-W query employed for 
evaluating server capacity was executed both with and without flushing the database 
buffers and operating system file caches between repetitions of the same experiment. 
Fluctuations due to caching were most pronounced when executing the selected query 
against an ITEM table containing one hundred thousand rows and to a lesser degree, 
against an ITEM table containing one million rows. As predicted by Bitton et al. (1983), 
the effects of caching are negligible when the query is executed against a table that is 
significantly larger than the capacity of the database buffer cache. When the selected 
TPC-W query was executed against an ITEM table containing 10 million rows, flushing 
the buffer cache between repetitions of the same experiment produced results similar to 
experiments performed without flushing the buffer cache. 
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Figure 16. Effect of Caching on TPC-W Query Throughput 
 
Findings 
The results obtained by the author during the experimentation phase of the study 
were recorded using the sign table methodology as described by Jain (1991). Detailed 
results are presented in tabular form in Appendix M through Appendix P. The sign table 
methodology also provides a simple means for calculating variation attributed to each 
experimental variable. The author extended the standard sign table format to include 
calculation of variation due to each experimental variable and calculation of standard 
error for each set of measurements. Microsoft Excel was used to automate the 
calculations for each sign table. The formulas described in Equations 1.1 through 1.10 in 
Chapter 3 are used as the basis of the calculations in the Excel spreadsheets used to 
generate the sign tables. Calculations of mean values are based upon the geometric mean 
in cases where the underlying data consists of normalized values. As discussed by Dixit 
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(1992), aggregated benchmark results based upon elapsed time of execution are to be 
averaged using the geometric mean rather than the arithmetic mean. 
The first experiment evaluated the performance of read-only (query) transactions 
and read-write (update) transactions against selected queries from the TPC-W benchmark 
populated with one hundred thousand items. There were three repetitions of each trial 
within the experiment for each of the access control mechanisms evaluated. Query 
durations reported are based upon the geometric mean of the three repetitions. The 
database and O/S buffers were flushed prior to the execution of each benchmark. 
Confidence intervals for the experiment are depicted in Table 7. With 95% confidence, 
the margin of error is less than ±5%. Results for this experiment are summarized in 
Figure 17, Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20.  
Table 7. Confidence intervals for TPC-W benchmarks - 100,000 Items 
Items 
Fine-Grained Access Control 
Mechanism se sqi 90% 95% 
100,000 Authorization Views 75.97 15.51 ±20.73 ±27.08 
100,000 Hippocratic Database 62.36 12.73 ±17.02 ±22.23 
100,000 Label Based Access Control 65.25 13.32 ±17.81 ±23.26 
100,000 Transparent Query Rewrite 57.49 11.74 ±15.69 ±20.49 
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Figure 17. Average query duration for TPC-W simple queries - 100,000 Items 
 
 
   
  
Figure 18. Average query duration for TPC-W simple updates - 100,000 Items 
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Figure 19. Average query duration for TPC-W complex queries - 100,000 Items 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Average query duration for TPC-W complex updates - 100,000 Items 
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The second experiment evaluated the performance of read-only (query) 
transactions and read-write (update) transactions against selected queries from the TPC-
W benchmark populated with one million items. There were three repetitions of each trial 
within the experiment for each of the four access control mechanisms evaluated. Query 
durations reported are based upon the average of the three repetitions. The database and 
O/S buffers were flushed prior to the execution of each benchmark. Confidence intervals 
for the experiment are depicted in Table 8. With 95% confidence, the margin of error is 
less than ±5%. Results for this experiment are summarized in Figure 21, Figure 22, 
Figure 23, and Figure 24. 
Table 8. Confidence intervals for TPC-W benchmarks - One Million Items 
Items 
Fine-Grained Access Control 
Mechanism se sqi 90% 95% 
1M Authorization Views 68. 15.51 ±20.73 ±27.08 
1M Hippocratic Database 60.67 12.38 ±16.56 ±21.62 
1M Label Based Access Control 64.66 13.20 ±17.65 ±23.04 
1M Transparent Query Rewrite 64.97 13.26 ±17.73 ±23.16 
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Figure 21. Average query duration for TPC-W simple queries – One Million Items 
 
 
Figure 22. Average query duration for TPC-W simple updates – One Million Items 
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Figure 23. Average query duration for TPC-W complex queries – One Million Items 
 
 
Figure 24. Average query duration for TPC-W complex updates – One Million Items 
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The third experiment evaluated the performance of read-only (query) transactions 
and read-write (update) transactions against selected queries from the TPC-W benchmark 
populated with 10 million items. There were three repetitions of each trial within the 
experiment for each of the four access control mechanisms evaluated. Query durations 
reported are based upon the average of the three repetitions. The database and O/S 
buffers were flushed prior to the execution of each benchmark. Confidence intervals for 
the experiment are depicted in Table 9. With 95% confidence, the margin of error is less 
than ±5%. Results for this experiment are summarized in Figure 25, Figure 26, Figure 27, 
and Figure 28. 
Table 9. Confidence intervals for TPC-W benchmarks – 10 Million Items 
Items 
Fine-Grained Access Control 
Mechanism se sqi 90% 95% 
10M Authorization Views 75.97 15.51 ±20.73 ±27.08 
10M Hippocratic Database 50.02 10.21 ±13.65 ±17.83 
10M Label Based Access Control 55.93 11.42 ±15.26 ±19.93 
10M Transparent Query Rewrite 52.76 10.77 ±14.40 ±18.80 
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Figure 25. Average query duration for TPC-W simple queries – 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Average query duration for TPC-W simple updates – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 27. Average query duration for TPC-W complex queries – 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Average query duration for TPC-W complex updates – 10 Million Items 
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The fourth experiment evaluated the performance of read-only (query) 
transactions against data from the real-world wildlife application. There were three 
repetitions of each trial within the experiment for each of the four access control 
mechanisms that were evaluated. Query durations reported are based upon the average of 
the three repetitions. The database and O/S buffers were flushed prior to the execution of 
each benchmark. Confidence intervals for the experiment are depicted in Table 10. With 
95% confidence, the margin of error is less than ±5%. The results for this experiment are 
summarized in Figure 29 and Figure 30. The difference in query duration between the 
simple and complex queries against the wildlife data is approximately an order of 
magnitude. Therefore, the y-axis of the histograms depicted in Figure 29 and Figure 30 
have been formatted using a logarithmic scale to allow easier comparison between the 
two graphs.  
Table 10. Confidence intervals for Wildlife benchmarks 
Items 
Fine-Grained Access Control 
Mechanism se sqi 90% 95% 
Wildlife Authorization Views 224.65 64.85 ±90.598 ±120.62 
Wildlife Hippocratic Database 169.96 227.24 ±317.46 ±422.67 
Wildlife Label Based Access Control 153.96 205.85 ±287.57 ±382.87 
Wildlife Transparent Query Rewrite 121.03 161.82 ±226.06 ±300.99 
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Figure 29. Average query duration for Wildlife simple queries (log scale) 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Average query duration for Wildlife complex queries (log scale) 
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Scalability 
One of the goals of the author’s study was to determine scalability of the four 
fine-grained access control mechanisms evaluated. Figure 31 depicts the average 
response time for the control (i.e., no fine-grained access control) and four fine-grained 
access control mechanisms using a complex query from the TPC-W benchmark suite. 
The y-axis of the graph depicts the average response time in milliseconds (ms) and the x-
axis depicts the number of EBS’s (i.e., workload). Figure 32 provides a similar line-graph 
for the wildlife data where response times for complex queries are measured for the 
control and four fine-grained access control mechanisms. Note that the axes for Figure 31 
and Figure 32 have the same scale. Following the methodology of Elnikety et al. (2009)  
for visual analysis of response time versus load for TPC-W complex query (i.e., read- 
 
 
Figure 31. TPC-W response time for complex queries – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 32. Wildlife response times for complex queries 
 
 
only) transactions, it can be observed in Figure 31 that response time curves are nearly 
flat, which is indicative of excellent scalability for transaction processing that contains 
little or no update transactions. These findings confirm the statement by Menascé (2002) 
that the TPC-W benchmark exhibits excellent scalability. In contrast, the response time 
curves depicted in Figure 32 for the wildlife data, while similar for the control and each 
of the fine-grained access control mechanisms evaluated, indicate that scalability for the 
wildlife read-only transactions is linear. According to Gunther (2004), the linear response 
time curves observed in the wildlife benchmarks indicate that the workload is scaling as 
best as it can with the limited computing resources provided by the small-scale processor. 
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FACE Model 
The sign table methodology provides a simple means for calculating variation 
attributed to each experimental variable. Table 11 summarizes the percentage of variation 
for the TPC-W complex query scaled to an ITEM table of 10 million rows. Table 11 also 
summarizes the percentage of variation for a complex query against the wildlife data.  
Table 11. Overhead imposed by fine-grained access control  
Items 
Fine-Grained Access 
Control Mechanism 
Fine-Grained 
Access Control 
Query 
Complexity 
SQL 
Operation 
10 Million Authorization Views 3% 31% 33% 
10 Million Hippocratic Database 6% 27% 33% 
10 Million Label Based Access Control 69% 18% 5% 
10 Million Transparent Query Rewrite 5% 27% 27% 
Wildlife Authorization Views 1% 99% N/A 
Wildlife Hippocratic Database 7% 93% N/A 
Wildlife Label Based Access Control 7% 93% N/A 
Wildlife Transparent Query Rewrite 7% 93% N/A 
 
Figure 33 depicts a throughput graph for TPC-W complex queries scaled to 10 
million items. Figure 34 depicts a response time graph for TPC-W complex queries 
scaled to 10 million items. Figure 35 depicts a throughput graph for wildlife complex 
queries. Figure 36 depicts a response time graph for wildlife complex queries.  
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Figure 33. Throughput for TPC-W complex queries - 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Overhead for TPC-W complex queries – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 35. Throughput for Wildlife complex queries 
 
 
 
Figure 36. Overhead for Wildlife complex queries 
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The slopes of the throughput line plots (Figure 33) for the TPC-W complex 
queries are relatively flat for workloads with more than  2400 EBS’s, indicating that the 
workload scales linearly. The corresponding response time graph (Figure 34) indicates 
that the percentage of processing overhead for the TPC-W complex queries due to fine-
grained access control is low (<6%) except for LBAC, where the overhead is nearly 70%. 
The slopes of throughput line plots (Figure 35) for the wildlife complex queries depict a 
gradual negative slope indicating that the small-scale processor has reached its maximum 
throughput (Menascé and Almeida, 2001). The corresponding response time graph 
(Figure 34) for the wildlife complex queries indicates that the percentage of processing 
overhead due to fine-grained access control remains constant (<7%) for all of the fine-
grained access control mechanisms evaluated. 
 
Summary of Results 
In the author’s study, queries from the TPC-W benchmark and queries from a 
real-world wildlife habitat capability/suitability application were used to quantify the 
overhead imposed by the use of fine-grained access control. Four fine-grained access 
control mechanisms were evaluated – authorizations views, the Hippocratic database, 
LBAC, and transparent query rewrite. Benchmark results were summarized using sign 
tables and graphed using histograms to provide a simple visual comparison of the 
mechanisms evaluated. In terms of average query duration, a simple database query 
against the wildlife data was demonstrated to be roughly equivalent to a complex query 
against the TPC-W data scaled to 10 million items. Complex queries against the wildlife 
data had an average query duration that was 10 times greater than the wildlife simple 
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queries. Based upon measurements of average query duration, there were approximately 
three orders of magnitude between the simplest TPC-W query evaluated and the most 
complex query executed against the wildlife data. Thus, the workload employed in the 
author’s study was demonstrated to provide good scalability. 
The test results from the first experiment revealed that for simple read-only 
transactions executed against a PostgreSQL database scaled to one hundred thousand 
TPC-W items, the overhead imposed by the use of authorization views, the Hippocratic 
database, and transparent query rewrite were roughly equivalent. In contrast, the use of 
LBAC for simple read-only transactions was observed to impose performance costs that 
were nearly 50% greater than the overhead imposed by the three other fine-grained 
access control mechanisms. In the case of simple read-write transactions executed against 
a PostgreSQL database scaled to one hundred thousand TPC-W items, the overhead 
imposed by the use of authorization views, the Hippocratic database, and transparent 
query rewrite were similar to the performance overhead observed for simple read-only 
transactions. However, the total overhead per transaction was marginally higher. As was 
the case for simple read-only transactions, the use of LBAC was observed to impose 
performance costs that were approximately 50% greater than the overhead imposed by 
the other three fine-grained access control mechanisms. 
Test results from the first experiment revealed that for complex read-only 
transactions executed against a PostgreSQL database scaled to one hundred thousand 
TPC-W items, the overhead imposed by the use of authorization views, the Hippocratic 
database, and transparent query rewrite were roughly equivalent. Complex read-write 
transactions executed against the same database exhibited similar characteristics although 
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the overhead per transaction was lower than for read-only transactions, which is the 
opposite behavior observed for simple transactions and updates. However as was the case 
with complex read-only and read-write transactions, the use of LBAC was observed to 
imposed performance costs nearly 50% greater than the overhead imposed by the other 
three fine-grained access control mechanisms. 
Test results from the second experiment revealed that for simple read-only 
transactions and simple read-write transactions executed against a PostgreSQL database 
scaled to one million TPC-W items, the overhead imposed by the use of authorization 
views, the Hippocratic database, and transparent query rewrite were roughly equivalent. 
The use of LBAC for simple read-only transactions and simple read-write transactions 
was observed to impose performance costs that were nearly 50% greater than the 
overhead imposed by the other three fine-grained access control mechanisms. In the case 
of complex read-only transactions and complex read-write transactions executed against a 
PostgreSQL database scaled to one million TPC-W items, performance costs associated 
with the use of fine-grained access control were similar to simple read-only and simple 
read-write transactions. However, the performance impacts were lower for the read-write 
transactions than for read-only transactions. 
Test results for the third experiment revealed that for simple read-only 
transactions and simple read-write transactions executed against a PostgreSQL database 
scaled to 10 million TPC-W items, the overhead imposed by the use of authorization 
views, the Hippocratic database, and transparent query rewrite were roughly equivalent. 
The use of LBAC for simple read-only transactions and simple read-write transactions 
was observed to impose performance costs that were nearly 50% greater than the 
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overhead imposed by the three other fine-grained access control mechanisms. In the case 
of complex read-only transactions and complex read-write transactions executed against a 
PostgreSQL database scaled to 10 million TPC-W items, performance costs associated 
with the use of fine-grained access control were similar to simple read-only and simple 
read-write transactions. However, the performance impacts were lower for the read-write 
transactions than for read-only transactions.  
Test results for the fourth experiment revealed that for simple read-only 
transactions executed against a PostgreSQL database containing data from the real-world 
wildlife application, the overhead imposed by the use of authorization views, the 
Hippocratic database, and transparent query rewrite were equivalent. The use of LBAC 
imposed only slightly greater performance costs than for the other fine-grained access 
control mechanisms. In the case of complex read-only transactions executed against a 
PostgreSQL database containing data from the real-world wildlife application, 
performance costs associated with the use of fine-grained access control were similar to 
simple read-only transactions. Significantly, there were no discernible differences in the 
performance overhead associated with authorization views, the Hippocratic database, 
LBAC, and transparent query rewrite. 
One of the goals of the study was to quantify the scalability of the four selected 
fine-grained access control mechanisms. Scalability was established by comparing 
average query duration versus workload as described by Elnikety et al. (2009). The query 
duration versus workload line graphs for the author’s TPC-W benchmarks were very 
similar to the research findings reported by Elnikety et al. for TPC-W benchmark 
workloads. The query duration versus workload graphs for the wildlife data benchmarked 
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by the author were linear, indicating that query processing that includes fine-grained 
access control mechanisms, are scalable within the processing capacity of the small-scale 
server used for benchmarking. 
The FACE model employs simple, line graphs to represent the scalability and 
overhead imposed by the four fine-grained access control mechanisms evaluated. The 
results presented indicate that the overhead for complex queries against large data sets is 
minimal, typically 7% or less. The slope of the response time curves indicate that under 
higher workload, specifically 2400 EBS’s or greater, that the fine-grained access control 
mechanisms are scalable. It should be noted however that in the sign tables presented in 
Appendix M and Appendix N for TPC-W benchmarks scaled to one hundred thousand 
items and one million items respectively, indicate that the proportion of overhead due to 
the use of fine-grained access control is significantly higher for data sets containing a 
modest number of rows. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations and Summary 
 
 
Conclusions 
The FACE model provides a simple approach to quantifying the scalability and 
performance of typical fine-grained access control mechanisms used with relational 
database management systems. The literature contains references to approaches that 
quantify the performance and scalability of individual fine-grained access control 
mechanisms used with relational database management systems. However, quantification 
of the performance overhead for multiple fine-grained access control mechanisms against 
the same data has not been previously described. 
A novel aspect of the author’s study was the evaluation of performance and 
scalability associated with read-write transactions where fine-grained access control was 
implemented. Most of the current literature describing fine-grained access control focuses 
solely upon read-only transactions. In the author’s study, it was demonstrated that in the 
case of SQL UPDATE transactions, where fine-grained access control was implemented, 
scalability and performance overhead were equivalent to read-only transactions. 
The existing research studies suggest that some fine-grained access control 
mechanisms are not scalable. For example, Bertino et al. (2006) suggest that 
authorization views are not scalable due to the associated overhead with managing a large 
number of views. However, this is quite different from scalability of authorization views 
from the standpoint of performance overhead. As demonstrated in Figure 31 and Figure 
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32, authorization views, the Hippocratic Database, LBAC, and transparent query rewrite 
are all scalable mechanisms from the standpoint of performance overhead versus 
workload. Contrary to widely held beliefs in the database community that the use of fine-
grained access control can impose onerous performance overhead, the simple visual 
model provided by FACE demonstrates that the performance impacts tend to be minimal, 
representing an acceptable compromise between enhanced security and reduced 
performance. 
 
 Implications  
Based upon the results of this study, a number of current approaches to 
implementing fine-grained access control for relational database management systems are 
deemed eminently practical for use in securing large Web-based applications. All of the 
fine-grained access control mechanisms evaluated in the author’s study, with the 
exception of LBAC, may be deployed without concern for the performance and 
scalability of these mechanisms. Even LBAC, when used with large complex queries, has 
been shown to impose minimal impact in terms of additional processing overhead. 
Nevertheless, concerns around manageability (Bertino & Sandhu, 2005) and 
completeness (Wang et al., 2007) should still be considered in the design of Web-based 
applications that connect to relational database management systems employing fine-
grained access control.  
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Recommendations 
The author’s experimental work was performed using small-scale servers with 
single-core processors that were manufactured nearly a decade ago. While this server 
architecture is well documented in the literature, particularly with reference to evaluation 
of fine-grained access control mechanisms, it represents a simplistic approximation of the 
multi-core, multi-processor servers currently used to host large relational database 
management systems. There is a need for future research that models performance of 
large-scale relational database management systems in a multi-core, multi-processor 
environment. Hill and Marty (2008) describe some of the challenges facing database 
professionals and system architects tasked with deploying applications to multi-core, 
multi-processor servers. Determining scalability is paramount among those concerns. 
A problem faced by the author was the significant effort required to configure, 
validate, and execute benchmarks to evaluate the performance overhead associated with 
fine-grained access control. Keeton and Patterson (2000) describe the benefits of using 
microbenchmarks for studying database workloads. Among the benefits of 
microbenchmarks are the requirements for less hardware, less configuration, and simpler 
database deployments. Properly configured microbenchmarks are particularly useful if 
they provide the same resource usage patterns as larger, better-documented workloads 
such as the TPC-W. Additional database performance research using microbenchmarks 
would be extremely useful, particularly if the methodology was well documented and the 
benchmark software developed through the research was packaged for reuse by other 
researchers. 
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Summary 
The FACE model was developed to provide a research based instrument to 
compare the relative scalability and performance of four common fine-grained access 
control mechanisms implemented within relational database management systems. A 
detailed description of the methodology employed in this study and the experimental data 
gathered has been provided. Analysis of data using sign tables provided a suitable 
approach for summarizing data and generating statistics to allow validation of 
experimental results. Recommendations have been advanced concerning future research 
that would make studies employing benchmarking easier to undertake, and easier to 
replicate, while at the same time being more generalizable to modern server 
environments. 
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Appendix A 
TPC-W Authorization Views 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.address AS 
SELECT * FROM public.address  
WHERE addr_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.author AS 
SELECT * FROM public.author  
WHERE a_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.cc_xacts AS 
SELECT * FROM public.cc_xacts  
WHERE cx_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.customer AS 
SELECT * FROM public.customer  
WHERE c_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.item AS 
SELECT * FROM public.item  
WHERE i_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.order_line AS 
SELECT * FROM public.order_line  
WHERE ol_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.orders AS 
SELECT * FROM public.orders  
WHERE o_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.shopping_cart AS 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart  
WHERE sc_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
 
CREATE VIEW authview.shopping_cart_line AS 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart_line  
WHERE scl_user_role = CURRENT_USER; 
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Appendix B 
Sample TPC-W Hippocratic Database Views 
 
 
-- Author View 
CREATE VIEW hippo.author AS 
SELECT a_id,  
  (CASE WHEN a_p1=1  
               THEN a_fname ELSE NULL END) AS a_fname,  a_lname, 
  (CASE WHEN a_p2=1  
               THEN a_mname ELSE NULL END) AS a_mname, 
  (CASE WHEN a_p3=1  
               THEN a_dob ELSE NULL END) AS a_dob,  
     a_bio, a_p1, a_p2, a_p3, a_user_role, a_sec_label 
FROM author; 
 
-- Customer View 
CREATE VIEW hippo.customer AS 
SELECT c_id,  
  (CASE WHEN c_p1=1  
               THEN c_uname ELSE NULL END) AS c_uname,  
  (CASE WHEN c_p2=1  
               THEN c_passwd ELSE NULL END) AS c_passwd, 
     c_fname, c_lname, c_addr_id, c_phone, c_email, c_since, c_last_login,  
     c_login, c_expiration, c_discount, c_balance, c_ytd_pmt,  
  (CASE WHEN c_p3=1  
               THEN c_birthdate ELSE NULL END) AS c_birthdate,  
     c_data, c_p1, c_p2, c_p3, c_user_role, c_sec_label 
FROM customer; 
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Appendix C 
TPC-W Label Based Access Control Views 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.address as 
SELECT * FROM public.address 
WHERE addr_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.author as 
SELECT * FROM public.author 
WHERE a_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.cc_xacts as 
SELECT * FROM public.cc_xacts 
WHERE cx_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.customer as 
SELECT * FROM public.customer 
WHERE c_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.item as 
SELECT * FROM public.item 
WHERE i_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.order_line as 
SELECT * FROM public.order_line 
WHERE ol_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.orders as 
SELECT * FROM public.orders 
WHERE o_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.shopping_cart as 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart  
WHERE sc_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
 
CREATE VIEW lbac.shopping_cart_line as 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart_line  
WHERE scl_sec_label IN (SELECT label FROM public.visiblelabels); 
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Appendix D 
TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Views 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE VIEW tqr.address AS  
SELECT * FROM public.address 
WHERE address.addr_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.author AS 
SELECT * FROM public.author 
WHERE author.a_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.cc_xacts AS 
SELECT * FROM public.cc_xacts 
WHERE cc_xacts.cx_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.customer AS 
SELECT * FROM public.customer 
WHERE customer.c_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.item AS 
SELECT * FROM public.item 
WHERE item.i_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.order_line AS 
SELECT * FROM public.order_line 
WHERE order_line.ol_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.orders AS 
SELECT * FROM public.orders 
WHERE orders.o_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.shopping_cart AS 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart  
WHERE shopping_cart.sc_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
 
CREATE VIEW tqr.shopping_cart_line AS 
SELECT * FROM public.shopping_cart_line  
WHERE shopping_cart_line.scl_tqr_ctx::text = app_context(); 
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Appendix E 
Sample TPC-W Benchmark Queries 
 
 
   -- TPC-W benchmark simple query   
   SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
   FROM authview.customer WHERE c_id = ${100K_C_ID} 
   FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT 
 
 
   -- TPC-W benchmark complex query 
   SELECT * 
   FROM authview.item, authview.author 
   WHERE item.i_a_id = author.a_id  
        AND item.i_id = ${100K_I_ID} 
   FOR SHARE OF item, author  NOWAIT 
 
 
   -- TPC-W benchmark simple update 
   UPDATE authview.shopping_cart  
            SET sc_date = current_date 
   WHERE sc_id = ${100K_SC_ID} 
 
 
   -- TPC-W benchmark complex update 
   UPDATE authview.shopping_cart_line  
            SET scl_qty = ${100K_RND_QTY} 
   WHERE scl_i_id = ${100K_SC_ID} 
        AND scl_sc_id IN  
                 (SELECT scl_sc_id  
                  FROM authview.shopping_cart_line 
                  WHERE scl_i_id = ${100K_SC_ID}) 
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Appendix F 
Sample Wildlife Benchmark Queries 
 
 
    
   -- Wildlife benchmark simple query 
   SELECT species_common_name AS "SPECIES",  
                   ecoprovince_description AS "ECOPROVINCE",  
                   season_code AS "SEASON",  
                   area AS "AREA" 
   FROM (authview.bei_capability_ecoprov_summry 
   LEFT JOIN authview.bei_ecoprovinces  
                 ON bei_capability_ecoprov_summry.ecoprovince_code =  
                       bei_ecoprovinces.ecoprovince_code) 
   LEFT JOIN authview.bei_species_codes  
                 ON bei_capability_ecoprov_summry.species_code =  
                       bei_species_codes.species_code 
   WHERE bei_capability_ecoprov_summry.ecoprovince_code =  
                 (SELECT ecoprovince_code FROM authview.bei_ecoprovinces 
                  ORDER BY RANDOM() LIMIT 1) 
        AND bei_capability_ecoprov_summry.caps_p1 = 1 
   FOR SHARE OF bei_capability_ecoprov_summry NOWAIT   
 
 
   -- Wildlife benchmark complex query 
   SELECT area AS "AREA",  
                  perimeter AS "PERIMETER",  
                 qbei_tag AS "ID",  
                 zone_code || subzone_code || variant_code || phase_code AS "BEC" 
   FROM  authview.bei_polygon_attributes 
   WHERE poly_id = ${RND_POLY_ID} 
        AND bei_polygon_attributes.poly_p1 = 1 
   FOR SHARE OF bei_polygon_attributes NOWAIT   
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Appendix G 
Transparent Query Rewrite Stored Procedure 
 
 
 
-- VPD-like procedural language policy function to set user security context 
-- Note: The variable class 'context' is defined in postgresql.conf 
 
DROP FUNCTION app_context(); 
 
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION app_context() 
  RETURNS text AS $BODY$ 
  DECLARE usrctx text; 
BEGIN 
  -- Set value for variable class 'context' defined in postgresql.conf 
  IF CURRENT_SETTING('context.usr') = '' THEN 
    IF CURRENT_USER = 'postgres' THEN  
      SET context.usr = '%'; 
    ELSIF CURRENT_USER = 'tqr' THEN  
      SET context.usr = 'MANAGER' ; 
    ELSIF CURRENT_USER = 'benchmark' THEN  
      SET context.usr = 'CLERK'; 
    ELSE  
      SET context.usr = '-'; 
    END IF; 
  END IF; 
  -- User security context is memory resident after first iteration  
  -- of stored procedure 
  usrctx := CURRENT_SETTING('context.usr'); 
  RETURN usrctx; 
END; 
$BODY$ LANGUAGE plpgsql; 
 
ALTER FUNCTION app_context() 
  OWNER TO postgres; 
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Appendix H 
TPC-W Sample Query Implemented Under Apache Jmeter 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<jmeterTestPlan version="1.2" properties="2.1"> 
  <hashTree> 
    <TestPlan guiclass="TestPlanGui" testclass="TestPlan" testname="TPC-
W_AUTHVIEW_1M_SELECT_800" enabled="true"> 
      <elementProp name="TestPlan.user_defined_variables" elementType="Arguments" 
guiclass="ArgumentsPanel" testclass="Arguments" testname="User Defined Variables" 
enabled="true"> 
        <collectionProp name="Arguments.arguments"> 
          <elementProp name="EBS" elementType="Argument"> 
            <stringProp name="Argument.name">EBS</stringProp> 
            <stringProp name="Argument.value">800</stringProp> 
            <stringProp name="Argument.metadata">=</stringProp> 
          </elementProp> 
        </collectionProp> 
      </elementProp> 
      <stringProp name="TestPlan.user_define_classpath"></stringProp> 
      <boolProp name="TestPlan.serialize_threadgroups">true</boolProp> 
      <boolProp name="TestPlan.functional_mode">false</boolProp> 
      <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments"></stringProp> 
    </TestPlan> 
    <hashTree> 
      <ResultCollector guiclass="SummaryReport" testclass="ResultCollector" 
testname="Summary Report" enabled="true"> 
        <boolProp name="ResultCollector.error_logging">false</boolProp> 
        <objProp> 
          <name>saveConfig</name> 
          <value class="SampleSaveConfiguration"> 
            <time>true</time> 
            <latency>true</latency> 
            <timestamp>true</timestamp> 
            <success>true</success> 
            <label>true</label> 
            <code>true</code> 
            <message>true</message> 
            <threadName>true</threadName> 
            <dataType>true</dataType> 
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            <encoding>false</encoding> 
            <assertions>false</assertions> 
            <subresults>false</subresults> 
            <responseData>false</responseData> 
            <samplerData>false</samplerData> 
            <xml>false</xml> 
            <fieldNames>true</fieldNames> 
            <responseHeaders>false</responseHeaders> 
            <requestHeaders>false</requestHeaders> 
            <responseDataOnError>false</responseDataOnError>            
<saveAssertionResultsFailureMessage>false</saveAssertionResultsFailureMessage> 
            <assertionsResultsToSave>0</assertionsResultsToSave> 
            <bytes>true</bytes> 
            <threadCounts>true</threadCounts> 
            <sampleCount>true</sampleCount> 
          </value> 
        </objProp> 
        <stringProp name="filename"></stringProp> 
        <boolProp name="ResultCollector.success_only_logging">true</boolProp> 
      </ResultCollector> 
      <hashTree/> 
      <JDBCDataSource guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCDataSource" 
testname="JDBC Connection - 1M" enabled="true"> 
        <stringProp name="password">benchmark</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="timeout"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="checkQuery">Select 1</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="trimInterval"></stringProp> 
        <boolProp name="autocommit">true</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="poolMax"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="driver">org.postgresql.Driver</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="connectionAge">5000</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="username">benchmark</stringProp> 
        <boolProp name="keepAlive">false</boolProp> 
        <stringProp 
name="dbUrl">jdbc:postgresql://192.168.255.204/tpcw1M</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments">localhost</stringProp> 
      </JDBCDataSource> 
      <hashTree/> 
      <RandomVariableConfig guiclass="TestBeanGUI" 
testclass="RandomVariableConfig" testname="1M_C_ID" enabled="true"> 
        <stringProp name="maximumValue">864000</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="minimumValue">1</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="outputFormat"></stringProp> 
        <boolProp name="perThread">true</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="randomSeed"></stringProp> 
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        <stringProp name="variableName">1M_C_ID</stringProp> 
      </RandomVariableConfig> 
      <hashTree/> 
      <RandomVariableConfig guiclass="TestBeanGUI" 
testclass="RandomVariableConfig" testname="1M_I_ID" enabled="true"> 
        <stringProp name="maximumValue">1000000</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="minimumValue">1</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="outputFormat"></stringProp> 
        <boolProp name="perThread">true</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="randomSeed"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="variableName">1M_I_ID</stringProp> 
      </RandomVariableConfig> 
      <hashTree/> 
      <ThreadGroup guiclass="ThreadGroupGui" testclass="ThreadGroup" 
testname="Load Cache" enabled="true"> 
        <elementProp name="ThreadGroup.main_controller" 
elementType="LoopController" guiclass="LoopControlPanel" 
testclass="LoopController" testname="Loop Controller" enabled="true"> 
          <boolProp name="LoopController.continue_forever">false</boolProp> 
          <stringProp name="LoopController.loops">15</stringProp> 
        </elementProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.num_threads">1000</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.ramp_time">0</stringProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.start_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.end_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <boolProp name="ThreadGroup.scheduler">false</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.on_sample_error">continue</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.duration"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.delay"></stringProp> 
      </ThreadGroup> 
      <hashTree> 
        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" 
testname="Dummy Request" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
FROM public.customer WHERE c_id = ${1M_C_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments">Simple query</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
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        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" 
testname="Dummy Request" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT * 
FROM authview.item, authview.author 
WHERE item.i_a_id = author.a_id  
AND item.i_id = ${1M_I_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF item, author  NOWAIT 
</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments">Complex query</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
      </hashTree> 
      <ThreadGroup guiclass="ThreadGroupGui" testclass="ThreadGroup" 
testname="Restart PostgreSQL" enabled="true"> 
        <elementProp name="ThreadGroup.main_controller" 
elementType="LoopController" guiclass="LoopControlPanel" 
testclass="LoopController" testname="Loop Controller" enabled="true"> 
          <boolProp name="LoopController.continue_forever">false</boolProp> 
          <stringProp name="LoopController.loops">1</stringProp> 
        </elementProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.num_threads">1</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.ramp_time">1</stringProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.start_time">1310052990000</longProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.end_time">1310052990000</longProp> 
        <boolProp name="ThreadGroup.scheduler">false</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.on_sample_error">continue</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.duration"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.delay"></stringProp> 
      </ThreadGroup> 
      <hashTree> 
        <org.apache.jmeter.protocol.ssh.sampler.SSHSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" 
testclass="org.apache.jmeter.protocol.ssh.sampler.SSHSampler" testname="SSH 
Command" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="command">/root/pgrestart.sh</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="hostname">192.168.255.204</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="password">8is2much</stringProp> 
          <intProp name="port">22</intProp> 
          <stringProp name="username">root</stringProp> 
        </org.apache.jmeter.protocol.ssh.sampler.SSHSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
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        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" 
testname="Dummy Request" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
FROM public.customer WHERE c_id = ${1M_C_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" 
testname="Dummy Request" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
FROM public.customer WHERE c_id = ${1M_C_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" 
testname="Dummy Request" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
FROM public.customer WHERE c_id = ${1M_C_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
      </hashTree> 
      <ThreadGroup guiclass="ThreadGroupGui" testclass="ThreadGroup" testname="1a" 
enabled="true"> 
        <elementProp name="ThreadGroup.main_controller" 
elementType="LoopController" guiclass="LoopControlPanel" 
testclass="LoopController" testname="Loop Controller" enabled="true"> 
          <boolProp name="LoopController.continue_forever">false</boolProp> 
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          <stringProp name="LoopController.loops">1</stringProp> 
        </elementProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.num_threads">${EBS}</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.ramp_time">0</stringProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.start_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.end_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <boolProp name="ThreadGroup.scheduler">false</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.on_sample_error">continue</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.duration"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.delay"></stringProp> 
      </ThreadGroup> 
      <hashTree> 
        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" testname="1M-
1a" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT c_fname,c_lname  
FROM authview.customer WHERE c_id = ${1M_C_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF customer  NOWAIT</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments">Simple query</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
      </hashTree> 
      <ThreadGroup guiclass="ThreadGroupGui" testclass="ThreadGroup" testname="2a" 
enabled="true"> 
        <elementProp name="ThreadGroup.main_controller" 
elementType="LoopController" guiclass="LoopControlPanel" 
testclass="LoopController" testname="Loop Controller" enabled="true"> 
          <boolProp name="LoopController.continue_forever">false</boolProp> 
          <stringProp name="LoopController.loops">1</stringProp> 
        </elementProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.num_threads">${EBS}</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.ramp_time">0</stringProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.start_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <longProp name="ThreadGroup.end_time">1309579657000</longProp> 
        <boolProp name="ThreadGroup.scheduler">false</boolProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.on_sample_error">continue</stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.duration"></stringProp> 
        <stringProp name="ThreadGroup.delay"></stringProp> 
      </ThreadGroup> 
      <hashTree> 
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        <JDBCSampler guiclass="TestBeanGUI" testclass="JDBCSampler" testname="1M-
2a" enabled="true"> 
          <stringProp name="dataSource">1M</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryType">Select Statement</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="query">SELECT * 
FROM authview.item, authview.author 
WHERE item.i_a_id = author.a_id  
AND item.i_id = ${1M_I_ID} 
FOR SHARE OF item, author  NOWAIT 
</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArguments"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="queryArgumentsTypes"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="variableNames"></stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="TestPlan.comments">Complex query</stringProp> 
          <stringProp name="resultVariable"></stringProp> 
        </JDBCSampler> 
        <hashTree/> 
      </hashTree> 
    </hashTree> 
  </hashTree> 
</jmeterTestPlan>
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Appendix I 
TPC-W Benchmark Graphs for 100,000 Items 
 
 
Figure 37. TPC-W Authorization View Query Transactions - 100,000 Items 
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Figure 38. TPC-W Authorization View Update Transactions - 100,000 Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Query Transactions - 100,000 Items 
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Figure 40. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Update Transactions - 100,000 Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 41. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Query Transactions - 100,000 Items 
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Figure 42. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Update Transactions - 100,000 Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 43. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Query Transactions - 100,000 Items 
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Figure 44. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Update Transactions - 100,000 Items 
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Appendix J 
TPC-W Benchmark Graphs for 1 Million Items 
 
 
Figure 45. TPC-W Authorization View Query Transactions – One Million Items 
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Figure 46. TPC-W Authorization View Update Transactions – One Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 47. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Query Transactions – One Million Items 
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Figure 48. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Update Transactions – One Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 49. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Query Transactions – One Million Items 
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Figure 50. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Update Transactions – One Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Query Transactions – One Million Items 
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Figure 52. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Update Transactions – One Million Items 
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Appendix K 
TPC-W Benchmark Graphs for 10 Million Items 
  
Figure 53. TPC-W Authorization View Query Transactions – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 54. TPC-W Authorization View Update Transactions – 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Query Transactions – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 56. TPC-W Hippocratic Database Update Transactions – 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Query Transactions – 10 Million Items 
 
 
  
156 
 
Figure 58. TPC-W Label Based Access Control Update Transactions – 10 Million Items 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Query Transactions – 10 Million Items 
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Figure 60. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite Update Transactions – 10 Million Items 
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Appendix L 
Wildlife Data Benchmark Graphs 
 
Figure 61. Wildlife Data Authorization Views - Simple Query Transactions 
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Figure 62. Wildlife Data Authorization Views - Complex Query Transactions 
 
 
 
  
Figure 63. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database - Simple Query Transactions 
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Figure 64. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database - Complex Query Transactions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 65. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control - Simple Query Transactions 
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Figure 66. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control - Complex Query Transactions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 67. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite - Simple Query Transactions 
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Figure 68. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite - Complex Query Transactions 
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Appendix M 
TPC-W Benchmark Results for 100,000 Items 
 
 
Table 12. TPC-W Authorization View – 100,000 Items – 800 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 13. TPC-W Authorization View – 100,000 Items – 1600 EBS’s  
  
 
 
 
  
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 877 SST 7169266.92
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1761 SSY 49964480.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 930 SS0 42795213.08
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2207 Se 34.64
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 582 Sqi 7.07
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 1850
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 908
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1567
10682.72 4087.597 541.956 -866.931 -216.924 -232.337 -455.299 -1002.38 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1153 SST 22948905.21
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2975 SSY 160284725.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2216 SS0 137335819.79
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3842 Se 57.23
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1185 Sqi 11.68
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3094
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1423
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3248
19137.11 7182.771 2323.486 -1235.89 -280.295 287.0689 -1538.1 111.4433 Totals
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Table 14. TPC-W Authorization View – 100,000 Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 15. TPC-W Authorization View – 100,000 Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 16. TPC-W Authorization View – 100,000 Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1651 SST 48708066.79
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3995 SSY 324853556.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3021 SS0 276145489.21
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5852 Se 71.01
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1556 Sqi 14.50
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4298
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 2279
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4485
27136.47 10123.27 4136.222 -1900.02 -49.79 -228.22 -2317.56 -1023.9 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2349 SST 80923582.59
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5531 SSY 597571422.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4285 SS0 516647839.41
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 7803 Se 60.19
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2274 Sqi 12.29
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5713
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3163
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6000
37117.75 12976.85 5384.143 -2817.8 -265 -423.161 -3030.46 -938.592 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2580 SST 132550926.86
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6932 SSY 894058242.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4986 SS0 761507315.14
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9584 Se 75.97
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2694 Sqi 15.51
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 7015
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3824
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7448
45063.14 16894.6 6622.579 -3100.83 -451.325 -1006.34 -3495.19 -942.825 Totals
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Table 17. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 100,000 Items – 800 EBS’s   
 
 
 
Table 18. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 100,000 Items – 1600 EBS’s   
 
 
 
Table 19. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 100,000 Items – 2400 EBS’s  
  
 
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 877 SST 6070678.91
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1613 SSY 46316346.33
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 930 SS0 40245667.42
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2028 Se 34.38
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 582 Sqi 7.02
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 1894
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 908
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1526
10359.62 3764.497 427.172 -538.739 -331.708 95.85499 -509.088 -1056.17 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1153 SST 21620653.37
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2860 SSY 154416176.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2216 SS0 132795522.63
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3812 Se 42.29
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1185 Sqi 8.63
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3249
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1423
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 2921
18818.11 6863.777 1925.36 -1263.65 -678.421 259.3119 -2104.52 -454.976 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1651 SST 46902982.62
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4031 SSY 323133974.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3021 SS0 276230991.38
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5642 Se 50.37
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1556 Sqi 10.28
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4510
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 2279
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4451
27140.67 10127.47 3645.373 -1548.19 -540.64 123.6049 -2315.77 -1022.11 Totals
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Table 20. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 100,000 Items – 3200 EBS’s 
 
  
 
 
Table 21, TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 100,000 Items – 4000 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 22. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 100,000 Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2349 SST 64491625.64
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5157 SSY 524342516.30
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4285 SS0 459850890.66
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 7485 Se 33.73
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2274 Sqi 6.88
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5162
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3163
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 5144
35018.12 10877.23 5134.472 -3533.91 -514.671 -1139.27 -3392.52 -1300.66 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2580 SST 116141360.54
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6785 SSY 809810975.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4986 SS0 693669614.46
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9548 Se 62.36
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2694 Sqi 12.73
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6154
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3824
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6438
43009.13 14840.6 6583.92 -4786.99 -489.984 -2692.5 -3755.18 -1202.82 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 877 SST 28639504.09
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2824 SSY 114908075.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 930 SS0 86268570.91
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3419 Se 29.53
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 582 Sqi 6.03
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2864
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 908
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 2763
15167.38 8572.258 873.5342 -933.223 114.6539 -298.63 -421.178 -968.261 Totals
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Table 23. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 100,000 Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 24. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 100,000 Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 25. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 100,000 Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1153 SST 133626515.24
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5521 SSY 471981957.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2216 SS0 338355441.76
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 6828 Se 40.05
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1185 Sqi 8.17
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4865
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1423
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6846
30038 18083.66 4589.587 -1399.11 1985.806 123.8519 -150.559 1498.987 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1651 SST 229313142.69
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7265 SSY 847369950.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3021 SS0 618056807.31
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9725 Se 50.59
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1556 Sqi 10.33
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6654
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 2279
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 8447
40597.43 23584.23 6344.707 -2724.95 2158.695 -1053.16 -1313.88 -20.2266 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2349 SST 412561435.04
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 9347 SSY 1549254372.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4285 SS0 1136692936.96
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 13833 Se 50.10
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2274 Sqi 10.23
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 8784
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3163
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 11022
55056.16 30915.26 9548.824 -4570.88 3899.681 -2176.24 -3293.01 -1201.15 Totals
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Table 26. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 100,000 Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 27. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 100,000 Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 28. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 100,000 Items – 1600 EBS’s  
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2580 SST 666198516.09
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 13320 SSY 2424978684.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4986 SS0 1758780167.91
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 16440 Se 65.25
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2694 Sqi 13.32
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 10970
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3824
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 13669
68484.16 40315.63 9356.271 -6167.95 2282.367 -4073.46 -1697.55 854.8184 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 877 SST 132233180.70
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1960 SSY 177881808.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 930 SS0 45648627.30
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2013 Se 33.50
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 582 Sqi 6.84
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2057
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 908
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1706
11033.12 4437.991 80.89547 -527.971 -677.985 106.6224 -129.256 -676.338 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1153 SST 35329818.94
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3732 SSY 196543248.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2216 SS0 161213429.06
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 4613 Se 44.20
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1185 Sqi 9.02
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3392
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1423
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3020
20734.09 8779.754 1810.197 -2695.42 -793.583 -1172.46 -2077.44 -427.897 Totals
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Table 29. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 100,000 Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 30. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 100,000 Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 31. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 100,000 Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1651 SST 48745669.72
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4218 SSY 333291238.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3021 SS0 284545568.28
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5575 Se 46.30
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1556 Sqi 9.45
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4638
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 2279
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4609
27546.11 10532.91 3420.798 -1382.31 -765.214 289.4847 -2031.74 -738.089 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2349 SST 71244520.41
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5881 SSY 582817240.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4285 SS0 511572719.59
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 6891 Se 33.16
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2274 Sqi 6.77
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5925
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3163
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6167
36935 12794.1 4076.639 -1876.6 -1572.5 518.0404 -1814 277.8694 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 2580 SST 136272394.03
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7029 SSY 917010195.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 4986 SS0 780737800.97
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9454 Se 57.49
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2694 Sqi 11.74
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 7382
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3824
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7679
45628.58 17460.05 6259.298 -2469.57 -814.605 -375.081 -3404.53 -852.16 Totals
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Appendix N 
TPC-W Benchmark Results for One Million Items 
 
 
Table 32. TPC-W Authorization View – One Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
 
  
 
Table 33. TPC-W Authorization View – One Million  Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
  
  
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1629 SST 1563979
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1784 SSY 80422008
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2051 SS0 78858029
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2235 Se 41.92
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1394 Sqi 8.558
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 1860
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1599
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1950
14501.31 1157.018 1168.305 -895.147 -86.4755 478.6679 -577.175 -144.816 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3082 SST 5160174
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3093 SSY 262520791
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3963 SS0 257360617
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 4138 Se 50.59
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2774 Sqi 10.326
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2968
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3045
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3135
26197.23 470.4182 2362.821 -2355.03 59.9126 99.04876 -1488.38 -268.765 Totals
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Table 34. TPC-W Authorization View – One Million Items – 2400 EBS’s  
 
 
 
Table 35. TPC-W Authorization View – One Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 36. TPC-W Authorization View – One Million Items – 4000 EBS’s  
  
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3807 SST 18540123
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4236 SSY 546341469
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5901 SS0 527801346
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5896 Se 68.65
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3492 Sqi 14.014
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4228
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 4513
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 5444
37516.27 2091.312 5991.098 -2162.66 -238.583 1241.933 -1516.75 628.826 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4912 SST 29550838
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5571 SSY 943321240
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7577 SS0 913770402
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 8198 Se 60.43
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4964 Sqi 12.336
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5749
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5913
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6479
49363.16 2631.031 6972.907 -3153.17 -256.774 71.94694 -3613.32 -181.649 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6231 SST 35092403
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6706 SSY 1473006520
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 9579 SS0 1437914117
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9600 Se 52.96
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 6868 Sqi 10.810
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6962
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8037
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7941
61922.84 493.5343 8389.967 -2309.65 -645.18 -497.733 -4093.45 264.8428 Totals
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Table 37. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – One Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 38. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – One Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 39. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – One Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1629 SST 1886683
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1731 SSY 76657476
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2051 SS0 74770793
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2341 Se 43.52
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1394 Sqi 8.884
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 1752
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1599
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1624
14120.51 776.2144 1109.939 -1383.32 -144.842 -9.50224 -953.659 -521.3 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3082 SST 5555757
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3115 SSY 264937966
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3963 SS0 259382209
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 4219 Se 41.48
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2774 Sqi 8.467
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2970
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3045
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3133
26299.92 573.1078 2417.462 -2457.75 114.5539 -3.67162 -1551.08 -331.462 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3807 SST 17456579
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4249 SSY 532521434
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5901 SS0 515064855
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 6031 Se 60.67
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3492 Sqi 12.385
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4345
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 4513
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4723
37060.85 1635.892 5274.966 -2914.27 -954.715 490.3283 -2477.39 -331.812 Totals
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Table 40. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – One Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 41. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – One Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 42. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – One Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4912 SST 27862284
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5549 SSY 932684574
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7577 SS0 904822290
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 8057 Se 46.37
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4964 Sqi 9.465
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5732
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5913
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6417
49120.87 2388.741 6807.192 -3069.43 -422.489 155.6931 -3539.49 -107.822 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6231 SST 39201059
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6754 SSY 1509066531
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 9579 SS0 1469865472
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10057 Se 59.23
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 6868 Sqi 12.091
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 7242
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8037
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7840
62607.04 1177.736 8419.024 -2634.77 -616.122 -822.85 -4883.16 -524.866 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1629 SST 15139957
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2857 SSY 153580603
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2051 SS0 138440646
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3695 Se 39.09
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1394 Sqi 7.978
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2803
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1599
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3186
19213.93 5869.634 1848.702 -1249.52 593.9212 124.2952 -671.58 -239.221 Totals
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Table 43. . TPC-W Label Based Access Control – One Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 44. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – One Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 45. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – One Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3082 SST 48630622
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5167 SSY 440133427
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3963 SS0 391502805
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 7273 Se 59.57
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2774 Sqi 12.159
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3068
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3045
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3940
32311.1 6584.291 4129.036 -6658.2 1826.128 -4204.13 -1843.43 -623.813 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3807 SST 142845245
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7167 SSY 1149612762
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5901 SS0 1006767517
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10683 Se 64.66
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3492 Sqi 13.199
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6755
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 4513
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 9497
51814.22 16389.27 9372.868 -3300.46 3143.187 104.1331 -1846.84 298.7365 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4912 SST 303396900
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 9847 SSY 2132259835
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7577 SS0 1828862935
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 15649 Se 44.21
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4964 Sqi 9.024
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 8511
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5913
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 12462
69835.29 23103.17 13367.58 -6135.23 6137.897 -2910.11 -3567.15 -135.485 Totals
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Table 46. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – One Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 47. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – One Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 48. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – One Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6231 SST 348819759
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 11088 SSY 3197112903
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 9579 SS0 2848293144
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 17612 Se 57.59
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 6868 Sqi 11.755
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 12205
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8037
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 15533
87151.87 25722.57 14370.2 -1868.54 5335.051 -56.618 -5375.76 -1017.47 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 1629 SST 1658357
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 1967 SSY 81068792
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 2051 SS0 79410435
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 2236 Se 51.46
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 1394 Sqi 10.505
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 1945
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 1599
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1732
14552.02 1207.721 682.8384 -1213.66 -571.942 160.1511 -698.473 -266.114 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3082 SST 5329042
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3400 SSY 274063588
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3963 SS0 268734546
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 4242 Se 43.33
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 2774 Sqi 8.844
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3116
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3045
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3149
26769.86 1043.047 2026.111 -2605.05 -276.797 -150.975 -1418.56 -198.95 Totals
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Table 49. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – One Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 50. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – One Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 51. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – One Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3807 SST 16839544
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4522 SSY 561100406
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5901 SS0 544260862
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 6019 Se 64.97
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3492 Sqi 13.263
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 4827
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 4513
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 5017
38096.75 2671.795 4801.995 -2400.15 -1427.69 1004.445 -2380.08 -234.501 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4912 SST 29827959
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6125 SSY 967974963
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7577 SS0 938147004
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 8371 Se 43.60
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4964 Sqi 8.901
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5939
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5913
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6217
50017.25 3285.126 6139.513 -3952.57 -1090.17 -727.45 -3683.8 -252.135 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6231 SST 35370069
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7377 SSY 1563181275
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 9579 SS0 1527811206
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10065 Se 53.57
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 6868 Sqi 10.935
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 7548
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8037
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 8125
63829.17 2399.87 7782.279 -2674.64 -1252.87 -862.719 -4289.77 68.52138 Totals
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Appendix O 
TPC-W Benchmark Results for 10 Million Items 
 
 
Table 52. TPC-W Authorization View – 10 Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 53. TPC-W Authorization View – 10 Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 54. TPC-W Authorization View – 10 Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1957 SST 23691323.40
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2477 SSY 127591594.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3149 SS0 103900270.60
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3676 Se 46.01
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 533 Sqi 9.39
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2068
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 808
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 1977
16645.34 3750.867 2574.525 -5874.01 -360.33 1657.485 -2206.42 -374.159 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3570 SST -24690177.75
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3805 SSY 373114808.53
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5558 SS0 397804986.28
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5512 Se 40.52
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3264 Sqi 8.27
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3449
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3649
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3763
32570.13 487.5022 4394.219 -4320.84 -350.54 109.3939 -2995.91 210.0333 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4988 SST 34884966.46
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5408 SSY 880997765.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7829 SS0 846112798.54
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 8127 Se 43.43
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4886 Sqi 8.87
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5315
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5210
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 5738
47500.53 1675.533 6307.201 -5203.66 -22.3987 240.2942 -4813.87 219.5486 Totals
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Table 55. TPC-W Authorization View – 10 Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 56. TPC-W Authorization View – 10 Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
 
Table 57. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 10 Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
   
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6660 SST 53780380.66
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7173 SSY 1486221413.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 10337 SS0 1432441032.34
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10051 Se 65.58
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 5965 Sqi 13.39
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 7179
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 6819
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7621
61804.88 2243.515 7851.309 -6638.31 -1210.75 1790.667 -5259.8 386.3932 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 7973 SST 76514326.77
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 8535 SSY 2176150235.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 12216 SS0 2099635908.23
1 1 1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 12453 Se 47.70
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 7648 Sqi 9.74
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 8158
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8469
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 9375
74826.66 2214.349 10198.88 -7525.87 71.51849 617.6432 -6121.82 720.2128 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1957 SST 22559551.83
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2344 SSY 128008921.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3149 SS0 105449369.17
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3547 Se 46.15
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 533 Sqi 9.42
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2419
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 808
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 2012
16768.97 3874.495 2262.92 -5225.58 -671.936 2305.908 -2525.7 -693.432 Totals
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Table 58. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 10 Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
  
Table 59. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 10 Million Items – 2400 EBS’s  
 
 
 
Table 60. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 10 Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3570 SST -24361922.32
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 4527 SSY 413982279.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5558 SS0 438344201.32
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5938 Se 40.68
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3264 Sqi 8.30
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3824
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3649
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3859
34189.44 2106.814 3818.856 -4996.84 -925.902 -566.61 -2979.89 226.0518 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4988 SST 34797521.68
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5446 SSY 881887171.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7829 SS0 847089649.32
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 8144 Se 41.30
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4886 Sqi 8.43
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5458
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5210
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 5569
47527.95 1702.945 5973.752 -5284.95 -355.847 159.0077 -5103.66 -70.2384 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6660 SST 66389767.01
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7009 SSY 1511931194.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 10337 SS0 1445541426.99
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10753 Se 50.02
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 5965 Sqi 10.21
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6994
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 6819
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7550
62086.85 2525.49 8830.675 -7432.92 -231.386 996.0552 -6012.14 -365.938 Totals
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Table 61. TPC-W Hippocratic Database – 10 Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
   
 
Table 62. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 63. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 7973 SST 79259146.15
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 8337 SSY 2189738354.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 12216 SS0 2110479207.85
1 1 1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 12659 Se 49.32
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 7648 Sqi 10.07
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 8561
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8469
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 9157
75019.63 2407.317 9980.7 -7350.07 -146.663 793.4394 -7146.81 -304.782 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1957 SST 51329835.91
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3704 SSY 241429294.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3149 SS0 190099458.09
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 4957 Se 54.46
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 533 Sqi 11.12
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3540
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 808
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 3867
22515.15 9620.674 3046.435 -5020.09 111.5797 2511.397 -1842.24 -9.97863 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3570 SST -81161470.44
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 6371 SSY 693276063.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5558 SS0 774437533.44
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 9344 Se 47.41
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3264 Sqi 9.68
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5966
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3649
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7723
45444.11 13361.48 7102.525 -4240.89 2357.767 189.342 -2818.75 387.1921 Totals
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Table 64.TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 65. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 66. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
  
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4988 SST 234640734.28
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 8671 SSY 1906151808.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7829 SS0 1671511073.72
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 12929 Se 55.93
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4886 Sqi 11.42
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 9090
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5210
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 13161
66763.48 20938.48 11493.06 -2070.85 5163.458 3373.111 -2703.14 2330.28 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6660 SST 392633865.42
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 11567 SSY 3124982748.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 10337 SS0 2732348882.58
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 18362 Se 46.40
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 5965 Sqi 9.47
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 10770
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 6819
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 14879
85359.61 25798.25 15434.76 -8494.85 6372.695 -65.8682 -5509.4 136.7946 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 7973 SST 583845493.41
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 13728 SSY 4646462431.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 12216 SS0 4062616937.59
1 1 1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 22254 Se 37.53
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 7648 Sqi 7.66
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 13018
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8469
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 18779
104084.8 31472.49 19349.68 -8256.44 9222.321 -112.927 -6186.35 655.6839 Totals
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Table 67. TPC-W Label Based Access Control  – 10 Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 68. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 69. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
 
 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3570 SST -33661289.01
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3873 SSY 378872768.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5558 SS0 412534057.01
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5439 Se 45.52
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3264 Sqi 9.29
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3754
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3649
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4060
33167.62 1084.99 4243.791 -3712.05 -500.968 718.1785 -2862.94 343.0022 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4988 SST 30903987.63
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5532 SSY 901634461.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7829 SS0 870730473.37
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 7942 Se 42.57
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4886 Sqi 8.69
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5744
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5210
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6057
48186.59 2361.593 5888.46 -4395.57 -441.139 1048.389 -4614.31 419.1125 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6660 SST 392633865.42
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 11567 SSY 3124982748.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 10337 SS0 2732348882.58
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 18362 Se 46.40
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 5965 Sqi 9.47
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 10770
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 6819
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 14879
85359.61 25798.25 15434.76 -8494.85 6372.695 -65.8682 -5509.4 136.7946 Totals
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Table 70. TPC-W Label Based Access Control – 10 Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 71. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 10 Million Items – 800 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 72. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 10 Million Items – 1600 EBS’s 
  
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 7973 SST 583845493.41
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 13728 SSY 4646462431.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 12216 SS0 4062616937.59
1 1 1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 22254 Se 37.53
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 7648 Sqi 7.66
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 13018
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8469
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 18779
104084.8 31472.49 19349.68 -8256.44 9222.321 -112.927 -6186.35 655.6839 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1 -1 1957 SST 20682600.09
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 2240 SSY 125073825.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 3149 SS0 104391224.91
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 3289 Se 52.76
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 533 Sqi 10.77
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 2544
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 808
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 2165
16684.62 3790.148 2136.979 -4586.22 -797.876 2945.266 -2344.36 -512.097 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 3570 SST -33661289.01
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 3873 SSY 378872768.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 5558 SS0 412534057.01
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 5439 Se 45.52
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 3264 Sqi 9.29
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 3754
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 3649
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 4060
33167.62 1084.99 4243.791 -3712.05 -500.968 718.1785 -2862.94 343.0022 Totals
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Table 73. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 10 Million Items – 2400 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 74. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 10 Million Items – 3200 EBS’s 
  
 
Table 75. TPC-W Transparent Query Rewrite – 10 Million Items – 4000 EBS’s 
 
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 4988 SST 30903987.63
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 5532 SSY 901634461.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 7829 SS0 870730473.37
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 7942 Se 42.57
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 4886 Sqi 8.69
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 5744
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 5210
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 6057
48186.59 2361.593 5888.46 -4395.57 -441.139 1048.389 -4614.31 419.1125 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 6660 SST 60621905.08
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 7254 SSY 1494730394.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 10337 SS0 1434108488.92
1  1  1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 10427 Se 50.57
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 5965 Sqi 10.32
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 6857
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 6819
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 7522
61840.84 2279.477 8368.719 -7516.24 -693.342 912.7381 -5330.12 316.0727 Totals
I A B C AB AC BC ABC Mean ÿ
Variation
Sum of 
Squares
1 -1 -1 -1  1  1  1 -1 7973 SST 74743136.89
1  1 -1 -1 -1 -1  1  1 8849 SSY 2198354531.00
1 -1  1 -1 -1  1 -1  1 12216 SS0 2123611394.11
1 1 1 -1  1 -1 -1 -1 12461 Se 47.45
1 -1 -1  1 1 -1 -1  1 7648 Sqi 9.69
1  1 -1  1 -1 1 -1 -1 8246
1 -1  1  1 -1 -1  1 -1 8469
1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 9391
75252.67 2640.355 9821.083 -7743.69 -306.281 399.8164 -5887.66 954.368 Totals
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Appendix P 
Wildlife Data Benchmark Results 
 
 
Table 76. Wildlife Data Authorization Views – 800 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 77. Wildlife Data Authorization Views – 1600 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 78. Wildlife Data Authorization Views – 2400 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 79. Wildlife Data Authorization Views – 3200 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 80. Wildlife Data Authorization Views – 4000 EBS’s 
 
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 1562 1544 1588 1565 SST 8833340320
1  1 -1 -1 1663 1625 1672 1653 SSY 18743828157
1 -1  1 -1 55363 55385 55386 55378 SS0 9910487837
1  1  1  1 56313 56386 56370 56356 Se 37.11
114952.09 1066.97 108516.55 889.68    Totals Sqi 10.71
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 2985 2990 2927 2967 SST 35383610236
1  1 -1 -1 3287 3275 3240 3267 SSY 74940625248
1 -1  1 -1 110881 110588 110900 110790 SS0 39557015011
1  1  1  1 112574 112537 112790 112634 Se 159.86
229657.76 2144.22 217188.61 1543.85    Totals Sqi 46.15
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 4016 4036 4023 4025 SST 79776359342
1  1 -1 -1 4845 4869 4817 4844 SSY 168454645778
1 -1  1 -1 166532 166123 166076 166244 SS0 88678286436
1  1  1  1 168628 168897 168710 168745 Se 203.32
343857.11 3320.05 326119.89 1682.79    Totals Sqi 58.69
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 5367 5362 5372 5367 SST 142396001745
1  1 -1 -1 5957 5907 5972 5945 SSY 299938324484
1 -1  1 -1 221561 221476 221625 221554 SS0 157542322739
1  1  1  1 225629 225609 225121 225453 Se 211.61
458319.14 4477.16 435694.60 3320.62    Totals Sqi 61.09
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 6530 6568 6528 6542 SST 222950772667
1  1 -1 -1 7229 7210 7259 7233 SSY 468937015267
1 -1  1 -1 276221 276247 276411 276293 SS0 245986242600
1  1  1  1 282829 282286 282773 282629 Se 224.65
572696.83 7026.91 545147.60 5645.58    Totals Sqi 64.85
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Table 81. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database – 800 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 82. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database – 1600 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 83. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database – 2400 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 84. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database – 3200 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 85. Wildlife Data Hippocratic Database – 4000 EBS’s 
 
 
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 1353 1349 1346 1349 SST 6360993393
1  1 -1 -1 1453 1416 1461 1443 SSY 12919565900
1 -1  1 -1 35660 35681 35695 35679 SS0 6558572506
1  1  1  1 55012 55040 55076 55042 Se 31.07
93513.44 19457.45 87928.38 19269.71    Totals Sqi 8.97
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 2917 2992 2915 2941 SST 25409782366
1  1 -1 -1 2887 2804 2806 2832 SSY 51680626161
1 -1  1 -1 71183 71150 71258 71197 SS0 26270843795
1  1  1  1 110268 110052 110241 110187 Se 102.65
187157.13 38880.93 175610.76 39099.02    Totals Sqi 29.63
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 4082 3961 3998 4013 SST 57455635210
1  1 -1 -1 4168 4151 4105 4141 SSY 116435872752
1 -1  1 -1 106753 106973 106913 106880 SS0 58980237542
1  1  1  1 165515 165164 165505 165395 Se 169.96
280428.81 58642.86 264119.62 58387.06    Totals Sqi 49.06
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 5664 5595 5582 5614 SST 102963337474
1  1 -1 -1 5404 5428 5421 5418 SSY 208868959816
1 -1  1 -1 143325 143317 143460 143367 SS0 105905622342
1  1  1  1 221392 221396 221344 221377 Se 68.50
375775.86 77814.12 353713.44 78205.91    Totals Sqi 19.77
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 6792 6649 6751 6730 SST 159892343556
1  1 -1 -1 6937 6927 6972 6945 SSY 324333309640
1 -1  1 -1 178666 178789 178966 178807 SS0 164440966084
1  1  1  1 275817 275741 275733 275764 Se 124.26
468246.33 97171.62 440894.92 96741.80    Totals Sqi 35.87
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Table 86. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control – 800 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 87. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control – 1600 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 88. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control – 2400 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 89. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control – 3200 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 90. Wildlife Data Label Based Access Control – 4000 EBS’s 
 
 
 
Table 91. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite – 800 EBS’s  
 
 
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 1353 1349 1346 1349 SST 6421471065
1  1 -1 -1 2332 2355 2315 2334 SSY 13236841340
1 -1  1 -1 35660 35681 35695 35679 SS0 6815370275
1  1  1  1 55983 55932 55979 55965 Se 27.66
95326.60 21270.61 87960.05 19301.39    Totals Sqi 7.98
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 2917 2992 2915 2941 SST 25572825288
1  1 -1 -1 4727 4781 4794 4767 SSY 52886612343
1 -1  1 -1 71183 71150 71258 71197 SS0 27313787055
1  1  1  1 111917 111969 111906 111931 Se 60.74
190836.01 42559.81 175419.29 38907.55    Totals Sqi 17.54
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 4082 3961 3998 4013 SST 57791203335
1  1 -1 -1 6860 6890 6800 6850 SSY 118951651370
1 -1  1 -1 106753 106973 106913 106880 SS0 61160448035
1  1  1  1 167637 167861 167968 167822 Se 153.96
285564.82 63778.87 263838.32 58105.77    Totals Sqi 44.44
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 5664 5595 5582 5614 SST 103969971218
1  1 -1 -1 9057 9062 9020 9046 SSY 214094653642
1 -1  1 -1 143325 143317 143460 143367 SS0 110124682424
1  1  1  1 225035 225293 225154 225161 Se 113.13
383187.83 85226.09 353868.09 78360.56    Totals Sqi 32.66
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 6792 6649 6751 6730 SST 161781209961
1  1 -1 -1 11347 11358 11334 11346 SSY 332868278384
1 -1  1 -1 178666 178789 178966 178807 SS0 171087068423
1  1  1  1 280710 280634 280850 280731 Se 141.99
477615.00 106540.29 441461.55 97308.43    Totals Sqi 40.99
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 1353 1349 1346 1349 SST 6362840864
1  1 -1 -1 1704 1795 1792 1763 SSY 12998794684
1 -1  1 -1 35660 35681 35695 35679 SS0 6635953820
1  1  1  1 55295 55261 55261 55272 Se 41.20
94063.48 20007.49 87838.51 19179.84    Totals Sqi 11.89
  
188 
Table 92. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite – 1600 EBS’s   
 
 
 
Table 93. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite – 2400 EBS’s  
 
 
Table 94. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite – 3200 EBS’s  
 
 
 
Table 95. Wildlife Data Transparent Query Rewrite – 4000 EBS’s 
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 2917 2992 2915 2941 SST 25406693137
1  1 -1 -1 3290 3246 3272 3269 SSY 51883226030
1 -1  1 -1 71183 71150 71258 71197 SS0 26476532893
1  1  1  1 110519 110477 110447 110481 Se 58.23
187888.38 39612.18 175467.58 38955.84    Totals Sqi 16.81
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 4082 3961 3998 4013 SST 57298911268
1  1 -1 -1 4994 5004 4995 4998 SSY 116773513182
1 -1  1 -1 106753 106973 106913 106880 SS0 59474601914
1  1  1  1 165618 165835 165680 165711 Se 121.03
281601.61 59815.66 263579.59 57847.03    Totals Sqi 34.94
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 5664 5595 5582 5614 SST 102842970354
1  1 -1 -1 6214 6272 6285 6257 SSY 209461652709
1 -1  1 -1 143325 143317 143460 143367 SS0 106618682355
1  1  1  1 221892 221795 221716 221801 Se 93.80
377038.78 79077.04 353297.83 77790.30    Totals Sqi 27.08
I A B AB yi1 yi2 yi3 Mean ÿ Variation Sum of Squares
1 -1 -1  1 6792 6649 6751 6730 SST 160511853941
1  1 -1 -1 7685 7609 7693 7662 SSY 326263178624
1 -1  1 -1 178666 178789 178966 178807 SS0 165751324683
1  1  1  1 276944 276985 276797 276909 Se 141.59
470108.25 99033.54 441322.98 97169.86    Totals Sqi 40.87
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